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4EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report examines the rationale for putting investment in human capital at the
forefront of policies aimed at promoting economic growth and social cohesion, as is done in the
strategy outlined in the Lisbon Summit for turning the EU into the most competitive and
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. On the basis of a review of the relevant
academic literature, we reach the following broad conclusions. First, investment in human
capital contributes significantly to productivity growth. Second, there is clear evidence that
human capital plays a key role in fostering technological change and diffusion. Third, human
capital investment appears attractive relative to alternative assets, both from the
individual and from the aggregate perspectives. Fourth, policies that raise the quantity and
quality of the stock of human capital are compatible with increasing social cohesion. On the
whole, our findings suggest that investment in people is both a crucial growth factor,
particularly in the current context of rapid technological change, and a key instrument for
enhancing social cohesion, and are therefore supportive of the policy strategy set out in
Lisbon.
A brief review of the academic literature
There is a broad consensus in the academic literature that human capital is an important
determinant of productivity and other economic outcomes, both at the individual and at the
aggregate level, and that its role is particularly crucial in today's knowledge-driven
economy. At the microeconomic level, there is very clear evidence that school attainment is a
primary determinant of individual income and labour market status. Recent research suggests
that an additional year of schooling increases wages at the individual level by around 6.5%
across European countries and that this effect can be as high as 9% in EU members with less
regulated labour markets where pay scales presumably reflect productivity more closely.
There is also a robust relationship between individual wages and on-the-job training, with
some estimates indicating that a year of training increases wages by as much as 5%. These
findings are supported by the empirical work that examines the connection between human
capital and productivity at the firm level, which documents that high human capital
workers increase productivity and are a direct source of innovation and long-term
competitiveness. The literature also finds that the link between human capital and
individual wages becomes stronger in times of rapid technological change.
At the macroeconomic level, there is evidence that the contribution of human capital to
aggregate productivity growth is important, although considerable uncertainty remains about
its exact magnitude because of various econometric problems that complicate the
interpretation of the empirical results. What we consider to be the most plausible estimates
5in the literature suggest that, holding other things equal, an additional year of average
school attainment increases the level of aggregate productivity by around 5% on impact and
by a further 5% in the long run. This second effect reflects the contribution of human capital to
technological progress, i.e. to the development and adoption of new technologies and to the
continued improvement of existing production processes. Some recent research also suggests
that the quality of education may be just as important for productivity as its quantity,
although further work is needed before we have reliable estimates of the size of the relevant
effects.
Theoretical models of human capital and growth suggest that some of the benefits of a
more educated labour force will typically "leak out" and generate macroeconomic benefits
that cannot be appropriated in the form of higher earnings by those who undertake the
relevant investment. These leakages are often called externalities, and they provide an
important rationale for education subsidies and for other policies aimed at increasing human
capital investment above its "free market" value. The literature we have reviewed provides
some clear indications that such externalities do exist and that they are likely to be quite
large. A key finding supporting this view is that macroeconometric estimates of the
individual returns to schooling tend to be significantly larger than their microeconometric
counterparts (when the latter are corrected in a way that makes the two variables directly
comparable). Since macroeconomic estimates will capture all the induced output gains and
microeconomic estimates only the part of such gains that can be directly appropriated by the
individual undertaking the investment, the difference between these two figures can be
interpreted as a measure of the size of the externalities arising from human capital. In our
view, the most plausible sources of these externalities are the link between human capital
and the rate of technological change that has already been mentioned, and the indirect effect
of education on productivity and employment through the quality of institutions that may be
considered a component of social capital.
Two important limitations of the existing literature are i) that it only provides precise
quantitative estimates of some of the benefits from human capital and ii) that it has relied
almost exclusively on measures of the quantity of formal schooling. Existing estimates of the
returns to education do not generally take into account its direct consumption benefits, its
pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns in leisure and home production (although there are
indications that these can be quantitatively important), or the contribution of educational
policy to social cohesion. As a result, estimates of the rate of return to education as those we
will discuss below should probably be seen as providing a lower bound on the social benefits
that would accrue from increased investment in human capital. Another reason why the
social benefits to education are likely to exceed econometric estimates is the almost exclusive
reliance of empirical work on data on years of formal schooling. This variable is used in
practice for lack of better measures of the stock of human capital, i.e. of the skills and
6knowledge embodied in people that are useful in the production of goods, services and further
knowledge. It is widely recognized, however, that school attainment will be at best an
imperfect proxy for the true stock of human capital and that this generates a measurement
error problem that will cause the statistical results to understate the strength of the
connection between human capital and wages or productivity.
Human capital, growth and disparities in industrial countries
How important is human capital as a source of growth and cross-country differences in
productivity? Working with the most plausible set of estimates of the relevant
macroeconomic parameters, we estimate that, in the case of a "typical" OECD country, human
capital accounts for 22% of observed productivity growth over 1960-90 and for 45% of the
productivity differential with the sample average in 1990. Roughly two thirds of each of
these figures reflect the direct or immediate impact of schooling on the level of productivity,
and the remaining third captures its contribution to technological progress.
Rates of return on schooling and some policy implications
Using the same set of estimates as in the previous exercise, we have calculated the private
and social rates of return on schooling investment in a typical EU country and compared them
with each other and with the rates of return on alternative assets. The objective of these
comparisons has been to extract some conclusions about the optimality of observed investment
patterns that may be of interest for policy formulation. The exercise is somewhat involved
because it requires a series of adjustments to make the various rates of return fully comparable
to each other. Its results, moreover, should be interpreted with caution because there is
considerable uncertainty regarding the correct parameter values, the relevant rates of return
on alternative assets, and the size of the benefits from education that are not captured by the
existing empirical estimates.
 With this in mind, we believe our results support two broad conclusions, which should be
understood as applying to the average EU country.
First, a moderate increase in human capital investment is probably a good idea. The direct
economic returns to schooling investment that are captured by macroeconometric studies are
roughly comparable to those available from investment in physical capital. When a
reasonable allowance is made for non-market returns to education and for its benefits for social
cohesion, human capital becomes a rather attractive investment alternative from a social
point of view.
Second, an across-the-board increase in general subsidies to formal education at the post-
compulsory level is probably not necessary. This conclusion may be somewhat surprising in
view of our emphasis on the importance of human capital externalities, but it must be kept in
mind that education in the EU is already heavily subsidized and that compulsory schooling
7laws also tend to counteract such externalities and the resulting tendency for underinvestment
in education. An additional factor that helps to close the gap between the private and social
returns to education is that individuals and firms, unlike countries, have unlimited access at
given prices to complementary inputs whose use will raise the return on human capital
investment. These factors help explain our finding that, in spite of the existence of important
externalities, the private rate of return relevant for individual schooling decisions compares
quite favourably with the social rate of return on education and with those on competing
assets available to households.
Hence, the economic incentives for investment in schooling are probably adequate. If a
further increase in post-compulsory enrollments is considered desirable, it may be more
important to eliminate implicit barriers impeding access to advanced programmes (such as
liquidity constraints and lower levels of basic skills for individuals from disadvantaged
backgrounds) through policies specifically targeted at these problems, rather than further
decrease already low tuition charges that imply a large subsidy for relatively privileged
groups. Indeed, higher tuition fees coupled with a well designed loan programme or with an
increase in means-tested grants may be an efficient way to provide additional resources to
increase the quality of post-secondary education while at the same time reducing the
regressivity of its financing. Additional public funds, however, may be required at lower
educational levels and for the expansion of adult training.
Our analysis offers some guidance in identifying the most productive uses of additional
educational resources as well as changes in current practices that may increase efficiency.
Since the main sources of non privately appropriable "excess returns" from human capital
investment are likely to be this factor’s complementarity with technology and its contribution
to social cohesion, it may be argued that priority should be given to the following objectives.
First, aim to give technology-related skills to a broad segment of the population and ensure an
adequate supply of the technical and scientific personnel that is needed both for the
development and for the adoption of new technologies. Second, support life-long learning in
order to counteract the accelerated depreciation of skills in times of rapid technological
change. Third, improve conditions for the accumulation of research-related human capital.
Much of this human capital is generated as a by-product of research itself and human capital
policies should therefore strengthen the link between tertiary education and both private
and public research. Fourth, focus on improving the educational opportunities and the skills
of individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds. This is likely to require a focus on early
education in order to prevent the gradual build-up of handicaps arising from an unfavourable
home environment. Some recent international studies suggest, moreover, that performance at
the bottom of the student distribution can be significantly improved without lowering overall
standards. Fifth, existing results on the close link between the quality of human capital and
productivity suggest that an important contribution to growth may come from policies that
8raise student achievement.  The existing literature suggests that progress in this area may
come from improved curricula and teaching practices at least as much as from increased
expenditure, although the latter may also be necessary.
Conclusion
On the whole, the evidence we have examined is consistent with the view that measures
aimed at increasing the quantity and quality of the stock of human capital should be an
important part of any growth-promoting policy package. This is certainly so in the case of the
Lisbon strategy, which echoes many of the recommendations found in the literature.
Implementation of the human capital policies outlined in successive EU summits appears
especially important for those regions of the EU that are lagging behind in productivity and
income per capita. It is important to recognize, however, that successful action requires a clear
picture of the quantity and quality of regional human capital stocks in order to understand
local needs and to identify those policies that are likely to be most effective. For example, it
would be important to extend to the regional level recent studies that have tried to assess the
skill levels of younger cohorts and of the workforce at large, and to support further research
into the determinants of the performance of educational systems. These studies can be a useful
input for the formulation of a systematic human resources policy that should be an important
part of the EU's ongoing effort to increase regional cohesion.
91. Introduction
Two years ago, the European Union set for itself the ambitious goal of becoming within a
decade the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. To achieve
this goal, the Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon Council outline a strategy for taking
advantage of the growth and employment opportunities afforded by new technologies
without sacrificing social cohesion. This strategy involves a broad set of measures designed to
promote the development, adoption and use of new technologies through increased and more
efficient investment in knowledge, skills and infrastructures, the development of an
appropriate legal framework for innovation and for electronic transactions, increased
deregulation and the promotion of competition in relevant sectors, and financial market
reforms aimed at ensuring an adequate supply of risk capital. The document also underlines
the need to improve employment policies and modernize social protection systems so as to
promote social cohesion and gender equality while reducing disincentives and ensuring the
sustainability of benefit levels.
Investment in people plays a key role in the Lisbon strategy because it is seen as both an
essential growth factor and a key lever of social cohesion policy. Human capital is considered
to be a crucial input for the development of new technologies and a necessary factor for their
adoption and efficient use, but also a prerequisite for employability and an instrument for
fighting social exclusion and gender discrimination. Accordingly, the Lisbon document calls
for a substantial increase in per capita investment in human resources and sets out a long list of
objectives and policy proposals that focus on four areas: the promotion of digital literacy, the
increase in educational attainment beyond compulsory schooling, the development of a life-
long learning system geared to labour market needs, and the provision of an adequate supply
of technical and R&D personnel.
The present report examines the rationale for putting investment in human capital at the
forefront of policies aimed at promoting economic growth and social cohesion, as is done in the
Lisbon strategy. On the basis of a review of the relevant literature, we reach the following
broad conclusions. First, investment in human capital contributes significantly to productivity
growth. Second, there is clear evidence that human capital plays a key role in fostering
technological change and diffusion. Third, human capital investment appears attractive
relative to alternative assets, both from the individual and from the aggregate perspectives.
Fourth, policies that raise the quantity and quality of the stock of human capital are
compatible with increasing social cohesion. On the whole, our findings are therefore
supportive of the policy strategy outlined in the Lisbon summit and of the premises that
underlie it. They are also consistent with the important role attributed to human capital by a
recent OECD (2001a) study that advances similar policy recommendations.
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The report is organized as follows. Section 2 defines human capital and discusses the
reasons why it can be expected to be a key determinant of individual earnings and aggregate
productivity, particularly in today's increasingly knowledge-based economy. Section 3
reviews the relevant evidence available in the academic literature. Microeconomic studies on
the subject provide very clear evidence of a strong connection between human capital and
labour market outcomes (including wages and employment probabilities) that makes
education a key instrument for the preservation of social cohesion. At the macroeconomic
level, the literature suggests that, while there is considerable uncertainty as to the exact
magnitude of the growth effects of human capital, these are in any event sizable and justify a
high level of investment in education and training. Section 4 briefly discusses the recent
literature on social capital. In Section 5 we analyze the importance of human capital as a
source of growth and income disparities in a sample of developed countries, and provide
estimates of the private and social rates of return to schooling that are used to draw some
tentative policy conclusions.  Section 6 closes the main report with some general remarks on
the implications of our findings for the formulation of EU policies. A series of appendices
contain a more detailed review of the relevant literature and a set of human capital
indicators for the EU and its candidate countries.
2. Human capital and productivity in the knowledge economy
Human capital is a broad and multifaceted concept encompassing many different types of
investment in people. Health and nutrition are certainly an important aspect of such
investment, particularly in developing countries where deficiencies in these respects may
severely limit the population's ability to engage in productive activities. For the purposes of
this report, however, the key aspect of human capital has to do with the knowledge and
skills embodied in people and accumulated through schooling, training and experience that
are useful in the production of goods, services and further knowledge.
To flesh out this broad definition, it may be useful to distinguish among the following
three components of human capital:
• General skills related to  basic language and quantitative literacy and, more broadly, to
the ability to process information and use it in problem-solving and in learning. Basic
language literacy can be defined as the ability to retrieve information from written texts and
other materials and to encode information in similar media in an understandable and
organized manner. Quantitative literacy involves the mastery of the rudiments of
mathematics and the skills required to formulate problems in such a way that they can be
solved through the application of the relevant techniques. These skills may be seen as
partial aspects of a more general capacity for information processing and abstract reasoning
that involves the ability to retrieve information from various sources and combine it with
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relevant knowledge to draw valid inferences and to generate useful hypotheses or
generalizations that may offer insight into the solution of practical problems. 
• Specific skills are those related to the operation of particular technologies or production
processes. Examples include the ability to work with computer programmes of different
degrees of complexity, to operate, maintain or repair a specific piece of machinery, and the
techniques required in planting and harvesting.
• Technical and scientific knowledge, finally, refers to the mastery of specific bodies of
organized knowledge and analytical techniques that may be of relevance in production or in
the advance of technology, such as physics, architecture or the principles of logical circuit
design.
There is a growing consensus that human capital is an important determinant of
productivity, both at the individual and at the aggregate level, and that its role is
particularly crucial in today's knowledge economy. Workers with greater problem-solving
and communications abilities should perform better than their less skilled counterparts at
any task that requires more than the routine application of physical labour and will also
learn faster. Hence, skilled workers can be expected to be more productive than unskilled ones
for any given production process, and should be able to operate more sophisticated
technologies that place greater demands on their capacities. If skill does carry with it a
greater ability to learn and produce new knowledge, moreover, a more educated labour force
will also be able to achieve faster productivity growth, both through gradual improvements
in existing production processes and through the adoption and development of more advanced
technologies.
The available empirical evidence suggests that the importance of human capital as an
input has grown over time as production processes have become increasingly knowledge
intensive. Today, relatively few occupations involve only mechanical physical tasks, and a
large and growing fraction of jobs either reduce to the processing of information or require the
application of specialized knowledge and skills to the production of increasingly
sophisticated goods and services.1 This is also true in relation to the production of the
applied knowledge that underlies technical progress, which has gradually become more
reliant on explicit R&D activities, more closely intertwined with formal science and, as a
result, increasingly skill intensive.
The rapid improvement and spread of information and communications technologies (ICT)
in recent years is an important event that has significantly contributed to the development of
the knowledge economy and to the acceleration of the secular trends that underlie the rising
1A recent OECD (1999) study finds that over half of the combined output of its member countries is
produced in knowledge-intensive industries. These include not only advanced-technology manufacturing
sectors such as ICT, but also intensive users of new technologies and of skilled labour, such as finance,
insurance and communications services.
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significance of human capital.2 The implications of ICT are far reaching because these are
general-purpose technologies with potential applications in many sectors and because they
have greatly increased human capacity to store, access and process information rapidly and
at low cost. Hence, advances in ICT are likely to gradually spread to user sectors, making for
rapid technological and organizational change throughout the economy, and can be expected
to contribute to the acceleration of technical progress and to its diffusion by providing
researchers with powerful new tools and practically instant worldwide access to information.
ICT is also likely to increase competition in many markets by giving firms the possibility to
search for customers and suppliers all over the globe, and will further erode locational rents
and advantages by greatly reducing transport costs for knowledge and information outputs. To
use a currently fashionable term, ICT can contribute significantly to the process of
globalization (or to increased global competition) by making the world effectively smaller in
many ways. This will increase competitive pressures on national economies, and make it
particularly crucial for them to have access to an adequate supply of skilled labour in order to
stay ahead in the technological race and to have access to the potential benefits of the new
technologies.
3. Empirical evidence on human capital and productivity
The hypothesis that human capital is a key determinant of productivity has received
considerable attention in the academic literature. Labour economists have long been concerned
with the impact of schooling and skills on individual wages and other labour market
outcomes. Building on this work, macroeconomists have been using growth accounting
techniques to analyze the contribution of education to aggregate economic growth since the
1960s. Research in this second area has received a new impulse in recent years with the
development of a new generation of theoretical models that attribute to the accumulation of
knowledge and skills a central role in the process of economic development and with the
construction of broad cross-country data sets that can be used in the empirical analysis of the
determinants of economic growth. In this section we will review the relevant literature in
both areas of research with the objective of determining to what extent the available
empirical evidence supports the hypotheses laid out in the previous section about the micro
and macroeconomic links between human capital and productivity.3
Before getting into the specifics of each line of work, it is important to highlight some of
the similarities, differences and interconnections between them. In both branches of the
literature, the typical empirical exercise involves the use of statistical techniques (generally
regression analysis) to try to determine how an increase in educational attainment will affect
2
 See OECD (2001a) for a more detailed analysis of some of the implications of the "new economy."
3
 There are a number of excellent surveys in the literature that cover many of the issues we will discuss.
Among others, see Griliches (1997), Card (1999) and Temple (2001).
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individual earnings or average productivity at the aggregate level. Hence, years of schooling
is the measure of the stock of human capital most commonly used in both micro and
macroeconomic analyses. Sometimes this choice reflects a direct interest on the impact of
schooling per se, but this variable is often used for lack of better measures of human capital. It
is widely recognized that school attainment will be at best an imperfect proxy for the true
stock of human capital and that this generates a measurement error problem that will cause
the statistical results to underestate the strength of the connection between human capital
and wages or productivity. It is expected, however, that (since many of the relevant skills are
acquired through formal schooling) the correlation between years of education and human
capital will be sufficiently high for analyses that use the former as a proxy for the latter to
yield some useful information.4
In both the micro and the macroeconomic literatures, the theoretical framework that
underlies the empirical analysis assumes a stable technical relationship between inputs and
output that can be described by a production function. In the microeconomic case, the further
assumption is commonly made that observed wages reflect marginal productivities. In both
cases, the objective of the analysis is to obtain estimates of a technical coefficient measuring
the contribution of schooling to productivity. This parameter turns out to be an important
determinant of the return to investment in schooling and is often interpreted directly as such
(even though some model-specific adjustments are typically required to obtain the exact rate
of return).5
Comparisons of micro and macroeconometric estimates of the returns to education are
potentially of great interest because discrepancies between them can alert us of the existence
of externalities that drive a wedge between the private and public returns to schooling and
may call for corrective policy action. For instance, if the productivity of each worker
increases with average education at the aggregate level as well as with his own school
attainment, the first of these effects will constitute an externality and will generate a
tendency for underinvestment in education because individuals will fail to take into account
the indirect social benefits that can arise from their schooling choices. In this context,
microeconometric estimates of wage equations with individual cross-section data for a given
country will only pick up the own-education effects of schooling (because the indirect
aggregate effect does not vary across individuals within a given country), whereas
macroeconometric estimates with cross-country data should also capture the externality.
Hence, the finding that the return to education is higher at the aggregate than at the
individual level may be interpreted as evidence of the existence of positive externalities
that may justify public subsidies designed to raise investment in education to its socially
4
  Some recent studies that attempt to measure skills directly suggest that this assumption is broadly correct,
but also that things other than formal education contribute to the development and maintenance of skills.
See OECD and Statistics Canada (2000) and section 2 of the Appendix to this report.
5
 See section 5c below.
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optimal level. Conversely, the reverse finding may be interpreted as providing some support
for signalling or screening theories in which education does not necessarily increase
productivity per se but may still increase wages because it serves as a signal for ability (i.e.
allows employers to identify high-ability individuals) or as a credential for access to
privileged jobs.
Such comparisons have to be made with extreme care, however, because, even in the
absence of externalities, micro and macroeconomic estimates of the returns to schooling can
differ for a number of reasons. A first reason, to which we will return below, is that there are
statistical problems (biases related to the omission of relevant variables, errors in the
measurement of years of schooling and reverse causation from income to the demand for
education) that may affect the two sets of estimates to different extents. Second, it must be
kept in mind that micro and macroeconomic estimates measure different things. Even if both
sets of coefficients do indeed reflect the marginal productivity of schooling, microeconometric
estimates will tell us what happens to the earnings of an individual as his schooling rises,
holding constant factor prices and the economy-wide average level of education, whereas
macroeconometric estimates will capture the effects of changes in aggregate average
schooling on labour productivity holding the aggregate stock of physical capital constant.
Hence, the coefficients of micro and macro studies are not directly comparable and have to be
adjusted (in a way that will depend on the chosen econometric specifications) before valid
inferences can be drawn about their relative values.6 Third, it may be that wage scales do not
exactly reflect marginal productivities because of distortions introduced by labour market
institutions. In societies with a high aversion to inequality, for instance, collective
bargaining may lead to relatively flat payscales ("wage compression") that are likely to
make the estimated private return to education fall below its contribution to productivity.
Some allowance must be made for this possibility when comparing microeconometric
estimates of the gross return to schooling across countries or with their macroeconometric
counterparts.
a . Human capital and labour market outcomes: microeconomic evidence
Labour economists often distinguish between human capital accumulated during three
distinct phases of life: early human capital, mainly acquired at home, human capital
acquired through formal education, and human capital accumulated through on-the-job
training. Most of the work of empirical researchers has concentrated on the labour market
consequences of human capital acquired through formal education, mainly because it is the
component of human capital that is easiest to measure. In this section, we will briefly review
and summarize the main conclusions regarding the labour market effects of formal education.
6
 Essentially, the adjustment is needed to hold physical capital constant in the microeconomic estimates.
Under reasonable assumptions, the required correction involves reducing microeconometric estimates by
around one third. See de la Fuente (2002a).
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We will also touch on the economic consequences of on-the-job training, both for the
individual obtaining the training and for the firm doing the training.
The three basic conclusions emerging from the large body of empirical work on the labour
market consequences of formal education is that higher levels of education are accompanied
by higher wages, lower unemployment probabilities, and higher labour force participation
rates. Most of the work has been done on the link between schooling and wages. This is because
the resulting wage increase is the most important economic consequence of higher levels of
formal education. Moreover, as we mentioned earlier, wages are often seen as reflecting
marginal labour productivity, which implies that the link between formal schooling and
wages can be used to analyze the productivity effects of formal schooling.
i. Methodological issues in estimating the effect of formal schooling on wages
Empirical work on the effect of formal schooling on wages estimates the percentage
increase in wages implied by additional schooling. The main difficulty of estimating this
effect correctly is that individuals with high and low levels of schooling differ in many
respects, not just their schooling levels. Examples of such characteristics are family
background and ability. To the extent that these other differences are observable to
researchers, they can be taken into account directly in the statistical analysis. Standard
methods, i.e. least-squares estimation, can then be used to identify the percentage increase in
wages implied by additional formal education, holding other observable characteristics like
family background constant. But some characteristics of individuals are difficult to observe.
For example, there is often little information about the ability of individuals. This raises
difficulties, as it seems likely in some contexts that ability is positively correlated with both
schooling and wages. Omitting ability from the analysis and using least squares estimation
will therefore tend to attribute some of the wage-increase explained by ability to education.
Hence, the effect of schooling on wages would be overstated. Another problem in estimating
the percentage increase in wages implied by additional formal education is that individual
schooling is often reported with error. As we already mentioned, measurement error alone
implies that least-squares results understate the effect of formal schooling on wages.
Empirical researchers have taken two different routes in trying to resolve the difficulties
raised by unobservable determinants of wages and schooling as well as mismeasurement of
individual schooling. The first route consists of estimating the effect of schooling on wages
using data on (identical) twins. The basic idea is that twins are more similar in many
dimensions than two randomly chosen individuals and omitted determinants of wages and
schooling should therefore be less of a problem in estimating the effect of formal schooling on
wages using least-squares techniques. The second route relies on a non-standard statistical
technique called instrumental-variable (IV) estimation. The IV approach requires an
additional variable, a so-called instrument, that affects years of schooling but is not
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correlated with omitted determinants of wages or the measurement-error of individual
schooling. Using this instrument, the researcher first obtains an estimate of the effect of the
instrument on schooling and then on wages. The instrumental-variable estimate of the effect
of formal schooling on wages is obtained by dividing the latter by the former. Instruments
used in practice include institutional changes affecting school leaving age or changes in
tuition costs.
Box 1: Mincerian wage regressions and the "return" to schooling
______________________________________________________________________
Following Mincer (1974), the specification used to estimate the effect of individual
schooling on individual wages has been
(1) 
  
lnW S e e X ui i i i i i= + + + + +α θ γ µ φ2
where W  is the (hourly) wage, S  schooling, e experience, X  a set of other individual
characteristics, and u  the variation in log-wages not captured by the right-hand-side
variables. The parameter θ measures the percentage-increase in wages associated with an
additional year of schooling and is assumed to be independent of the level of schooling
(although this specification seems quite restrictive a priori, it has been shown to fit the data
well in many developed countries (e.g. Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2001)). Mincer shows
that under certain conditions, which include that there are no direct costs of education, θ can
be interpreted as the proper private return to schooling. This is why estimates of θ are often
referred to as the "return to schooling." Generally, however, θ will not be equal to the proper
return to schooling for several reasons, including the fact that there is a direct cost of
education (see Box 5 below). This is why we will refer to θ  as the Mincerian return to
schoolinig (sometimes θ  is also referred to as the schooling wage-premium or as the gross
return to schooling).
______________________________________________________________________
ii. Review of the estimates obtained with different methodologies
There are many circumstances where the only estimates of the Mincerian return to
schooling available are obtained using standard statistical techniques. It is therefore
important to understand whether estimates of the Mincerian return to schooling obtained
with least-squares techniques are systematically different from estimates relying on twins or
an IV approach. The growing literature on this issue suggests that, overall, the estimates
obtained using twins or an IV approach are somewhat greater than estimates using least-
squares techniques. The question of whether these differences are significant is analyzed in
Ashenfelter, Harmon and Oosterbeek (1999). Examining the results of several studies in the
US and seven non-US countries  between 1974 and 1995, they find that IV estimates and twin
studies estimates exceed least-squares estimates by 3.1 and 1.6 percentage points. This
difference decreases, however, once they control for the fact that studies producing no
interesting results --insignificant difference between the IV and the least-squares estimates
for example-- are less likely to be published. The corrected differences are 1.8 and 0.9
percentage points respectively.
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iii. Trends of the Mincerian return to schooling over time
It is well documented that the Mincerian return to schooling in the US decreased during
the 1970s and increased during the 1980s, generating a U-shaped time pattern of educational
wage-differentials. There is a consensus that these changes may be interpreted as outcomes of
shifts in the supply and demand for human capital. The basic idea is that the increase in the
supply of high human capital workers dominated demand growth during the 1970s, reducing
the Mincerian return to schooling. During the 1980s, however, the increase in the demand for
high human capital workers dominated supply growth, raising the schooling wage-premium
(e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992)). The growth in the demand for human capital is commonly
attributed to technological change.
The Mincerian return to schooling in Europe as a whole followed a U-shaped time-pattern
similar to the US. In the 1960s, the Mincerian return to schooling was higher than in the
1970s. In the 1980s, the Mincerian return to schooling dropped further, but started to rise again
during the 1990s. Denny, Harmon, and Lydon (2001) confirm this pattern by reviewing a large
number of studies on the Mincerian return to schooling for different European countries and
time-periods. Comparing the US with Europe, they show that the Mincerian return to
schooling in Europe exceeded the return in the US in the early 1960s. In the course of the 1960s
and 1970s, estimates of the Mincerian return to schooling in Europe and in the US fell at a
similar rate. But the US estimates reached their minimum at the end of the 1970s, while
European estimates continued to decline until the mid 1980s. The subsequent increase in
estimates of the Mincerian return to schooling was much more pronounced in the United
States. By 1997 the Mincerian return to schooling in the US was about 3 percentage points
higher than in Europe.  It is important to keep in mind, however, that while the overall
pattern of change in Europe was similar to the US, behaviour across European countries
differed widely.
iv. Differences across European countries
The Mincerian return to schooling varies considerably across European countries. For
example, Harmon, Walker and Westergaard-Nielsen (2001) find that the Mincerian return to
schooling is lowest in Scandinavian countries (around 4 percent in Norway, Sweden, and
Denmark; Finland is an exception) and highest in Ireland and the UK (around 12 percent).
Reviewing a large number of studies, they find an average Mincerian return to schooling of
around 6.5 percent in Europe. Similar evidence is provided by Denny, Harmon, and Lydon
(2001), who estimate the Mincerian return to schooling using homogenized data for different
European countries. They find large differences, with Norway at the bottom and Ireland and
the UK at the top. But there remains considerable uncertainty on how European countries rank
in the schooling wage-premium (European Investment Bank, 2001)).
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v. Female-male wage differentials
In most industrialised countries the gender wage-differential decreased during the last
decades. This is partly explained by the fact that differences in years of schooling among
male and female full-time workers have largely disappeared (e.g. Blau and Kahn (1997),
Harkness (1996)). Not only schooling of women, but also female labour force participation and
consequently women’s accumulated labour force experience has increased. These changes in
experience seem to have been even more important in closing the gender wage-differential
than the increase in years of education. Today it is not the amount of schooling, but rather
differences in what men and women study as well as differences in aptitudes and achievement
scores across subjects through which schooling appears to affect gender wage-differentials.
For example, recent results of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA;
OECD (2001)) indicate that while males are likely to under-perform in reading, women seem
to have a disadvantage in mathematics.
Less working hours and fewer years in the labour market lead according to standard human
capital theory to less investment in general human capital. Furthermore, women have
traditionally higher turnover than men. Expected job-separation may discourage investment
in employer specific human capital. Empirical evidence supports the notion that women are
less likely to receive training (e.g. Lynch (1992)). Furthermore, men receive a higher training
duration and are more likely to have jobs requiring longer training periods (e.g. Altonji and
Spletzer (1991), Barron, Black, and Lowenstein (1993)).
There has been a growing amount of research on the impact of part-time and temporary
work on the wages of women. Women are heavily over-represented in part-time and
temporary jobs, which typically pay lower hourly wages than full-time or permanent jobs.
While differences in schooling among male and female full-time workers have disappeared
completely for younger cohorts, part-time working women continue to be less qualified than
full-time working men or women. As a result, the relative earnings position of women working
part-time has changed little over the last decades (e.g. Harkness (1996)).
There is considerable evidence that the Mincerian return to schooling is greater for women
than men in European countries. For example, Harmon, Walker and Westergaard-Nielsen
(2001) find that the effect of schooling on female wages exceeds the effect on male wages by 5
percentage points in Ireland and by 2 or more percentage points in Italy, (West) Germany,
Greece, and the UK. Denny, Harmon, and Lydon (2001) argue that the differential is greater
in countries with lower female labour force participation.
vi. Effects of education on unemployment and labour force participation
Formal education affects life-time earnings also through the probability of
unemployment. For example, according to a study of the European Investment Bank (Heinrich
and Hildebrand, 2001), male university graduates have lower unemployment rates than
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Figure 1: Unemployment by educational attainment level
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Figure 2: Labour force participation by educational attainment level
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- Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, Spring 2000.
- The data refer to the population aged 25 to 64. Low attainment includes primary and lower secondary
education and elementary vocational training (ISCED levels 1 and 2); medium refers to higher secondary
education and vocational programmes (ISCED 3 and 4); and high to post-secondary training (ISCED level 5
or higher). There is no data for Ireland.
- Key: PT = Portugal; SE = Sweden; UK = United Kingdom; DK = Denmark; FI = Finland; FR = France; NL =
Netherlands; ES = Spain; total = entire sample; BE = Belgium; AT = Austria; IT = Italy; DE = Germany; LU =
Luxembourg and GR = Greece.
workers with less education in all European countries except Denmark. Moreover, the
differences are sometimes very large. In Ireland for example, the unemployment rate among
men with basic education is five times the unemployment rate of male university graduates.
In Finland, male workers with a basic education are twice as likely to be unemployment as
those with an upper-level secondary education. The pattern among women is more complex.
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Still, in the majority of European countries, the unemployment rate among women falls with
their education levels.
Education also affects labour force participation. For example, according to the EIB study,
Belgian  women with a university education are 42 percent more likely to participate in the
labour force than those with a basic education; similarly, Dutch women with an upper-
secondary education are 22 percent more likely to participate in the labour force than those
with a basic education. The only exception to this rule seems to be the UK, where women with
a secondary education are less likely to participate in the labour force than those with a
basic education.
Recent data from Eurostat also confirms the existence of a strong connection between
educational achievement and employment and participation rates. As illustrated in Figures 1
and 2, unemployment rates decrease and participation rates rise as we move from low to high
educational attainment levels in practically all EU countries (with Greece and Portugal being
partial exceptions in terms of the unemployment rate, which is highest in these countries for
intermediate attainment levels). For the sample as a whole, moving from low to intermediate
attainment reduces the unemployment rate by 3.95 points and increases the labour force
participation rate by 18.8 points. When we consider the difference between the highest and
the lowest attainment categories, these figures increase to 6.33 and 27.2 points respectively.
vii. The rate of return to education
So far we have only dealt with the Mincerian return to schooling. Now we turn to the
proper return to schooling, i.e. to the return on the resources invested in education.7 The
literature distinguishes two rates of returns, the private rate of return and the social rate of
return. The private rate of return relates the resources invested by those obtaining the
education (the opportunity cost as well as direct costs) to the private benefits of education.
The social return includes the public cost of education in these calculations. Notice that while
the social return accounts for the total (private and public) resources invested in education, it
relates these resources to the private benefits of education only (i.e. it does not account for
possible externalities).  Ideally, the social rate of return to education would relate all
resources invested in education to all benefits of education.
According to a recent OECD study (OECD (2001b)), the private return of a tertiary
education for men in Europe averages more than 12 percent. The country with the highest
return is the UK (17.3 percent), followed by Denmark (13.9 percent) and France (12.2 percent).
Italy (6.5 percent) is at the bottom of the ranking. The average rate of return to upper-
secondary education for men is also around 12 percent, with the UK (15.1 percent) and France
(14.8 percent) at the top of the ranking and Sweden (6.4 percent) and the Netherlands (7.9)
7
 See section 5.c below for a more detailed discussion of the calculation of the proper rate of return on
schooling.
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percent at the bottom. The average rate of return for women is similar when it comes to
tertiary education, but the rankings differ. The country with the highest private return of a
tertiary education for women is the UK (15.2 percent), followed by the Netherlands (12.3
percent) and France (11.7 percent). The average private return to an upper-secondary
education for women in Europe is around 11 percent, with France (19.2 percent) and Denmark
(10.5 percent) at the top and Germany (6.9 percent) at the bottom (data for the UK was not
available in this case).
The social rates of return are generally somewhat lower than the private ones. For
example, the social rate of return of a tertiary education for men is on average around 2
percentage points lower than the private return (the outliers are Denmark and Sweden where
it is 4 or more percentage points below). For women, the gap between the social and the
private return is similar (but the Netherlands now join the outliers, with the private return
exceeding the social return by 6 percentage points). Comparing the social and private rates of
return of upper-secondary education yields a very similar pattern.
It should be kept in mind that these rates of return most likely are lower bounds for two
reasons. First, these returns are based on least-squares estimates of the Mincerian return to
schooling. We have already seen that estimates of the effect of education on wages using more
sophisticated techniques yield effects that are 1 to 2 percentage points higher on average.
Second, the social rates of return do not include social benefits in excess of private benefits of
education (e.g. Arias and McMahon (1999)). We will argue later that, although there is
considerable uncertainty regarding these benefits, they are potentially large.
viii. On-the-job training, human capital, and productivity at the firm level
The literature on on-the-job training has examined three basic questions. First, does on-
the-job training increase productivity and profitability at the firm level? Does on-the-job
training increase wages? And who obtains on-the-job training?
There is clear evidence that on-the-job training increases productivity at the firm level
(e.g. Bartel (1991), Lynch and Black (1995)). Moreover, on-the job-training is also a source of
innovation and therefore long-term competitiveness of firms (e.g. Blundell, Dearden, Meghir,
and Sianesi (1999)). When it comes to firm profitability, the evidence is mixed, with some
studies arguing that profitability increases and others that profitability is unaffected.8 This
is not surprising, as the theoretical link between productivity growth at the firm level and
profitability is complex.
Individual workers receiving on-the-job training have consistently been found to earn
higher wages (e.g. Blundell, Dearden, and Meghir). For example, individuals undertaking
8
 For example, Bassi, Harrison, Ludwig and McMurrer (2001) show that firms investing in training pay
extra-normal returns to shareholders. They also emphasize, however, that while this correlation is
consistent with a causal effect, it may also reflect that training is a leading indicator of other factor
translating into high profitability.
22
on-the-job vocational training in the UK earn on average 5 percent more than individuals who
have not undertaken such training.
Regarding the question of who obtains on-the-job training, the evidence indicates that on
average training is given to workers with higher ability and more education. Hence, the
three components of human capital (early human capital, formal education, and on-the-job
training) tend to be complementary over the life-cycle of workers (e.g. Lynch and Black
(1995)). Still, on-the-job training of workers with low qualifications has large effects on their
productivity (e.g. Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, and Sianesi (1999)). There is also evidence
that training is especially productive in a rapidly changing technological environments (e.g.
Bartel and Sicherman (1993)).
Empirical work at the firm level also indicates a clear link between human capital and
productivity at the firm level (e.g. Lynch and Black (1995), Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, and
Sianesi (1999)). Moreover, high human capital workers are a direct source of innovation and
hence long-term competitiveness. This is not too surprising of course as firms employ more
expensive, high human capital workers only if their productivity offsets the higher cost.
ix. Technological change and the effect of human capital on wages
The most important explanation suggested for the positive link between wages and
schooling is that education enables individuals to adopt, implement, or work with more
advanced technologies. After briefly summarizing the main theories, we review empirical
evidence on the association between technology on the one hand and the demand for human
capital, wages and employment on the other. We restrict ourselves to the analysis of studies
using direct measures of technology.
The last decades witnessed major technological changes, such as the rapid spread of
computers, the expansion of computer-assisted production techniques and robots, and new
information and communications technologies. How do these changes affect the relative
demand for high human capital workers? There exist basically two hypotheses, which try to
explain the relation between the relative demand for high human capital workers and
technological change. The first hypothesis relates the rate of technological change and the
demand for high human capital workers. If highly educated workers have a comparative
advantage in adjusting to new technologies and implementing them, then the spread of these
new technologies is likely to increase the demand for high human capital workers relative to
low human capital workers. If the increase in the demand for high human capital workers
outstrips the increase in supply, the Mincerian return to schooling increases. The second
hypothesis claims that new technologies introduced in the last decades are skill biased, i.e.
replace labour intensive tasks and are complementary to high human capital workers. Hence,
the transition to new technologies results in an increase in the demand for human capital
holding output and relative prices constant.
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There exists clear evidence that more computerized or R&D intensive industries increased
their demand for college-educated workers at a faster rate in the 1980s. For example, Machin
and Van Reenen (1998), using R&D intensity at the industry level as a measure of technology,
provide evidence for skill-biased technological change in Denmark, France, Germany, Japan,
Sweden and the UK. Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1996)
document a strong positive correlation between the level of computer investment and the
demand for human capital at the industry level. Using a cross-section of US plants, Doms,
Dunne and Troske (1997) also come to the conclusion that better technologies are accompanied
by higher demand for human capital. Looking at the same plants at different point in times,
however, reveals that plants that adopt new technologies have a higher proportion of high
human capital workers even before the adoption of new technologies. Human capital is
therefore a pre-requisite for the implementation of new technologies. Aguirrebriria and
Alonso-Borrego (1997), Dueguet and Greenan (1997), and Haskel and Heden (1997) come to
similar conclusions using data on Spanish, French, and British plants.
While there exists evidence that technological change affects the relative demand for
high human capital workers, only a few studies examine the exact mechanisms. Some authors
conjecture that organizational change might play a key role (e.g. Dunne, Haltiwanger and
Troske (1996), Machin and van Reenen (1998)). In most industrialized countries, there has been
a trend towards less hierarchy and more flexible organizational forms, as workers are given
more autonomy and perform a wider range of tasks.  Caroli and Van Reenen (1999) use a panel
of British and French plants in order to investigate whether organizational changes such as
the decentralization of authority, delayering of managerial functions, and increased multi-
tasking affects the demand for human capital. They find these changes tend to reduce the
demand for low human capital workers and lead to greater productivity growth (especially
in establishments with higher average levels of human capital).
The increase in the Mincerian return to schooling and the rise in wage-inequality in the US
during the 1980s, combined with the widespread notion that technological change may be the
driving force behind it, triggered a large number of studies on the link between wages and
technological change. The consensus emerging from these studies is that the increase in the
schooling wage-premium and the rise in wage-inequality are driven by technological change.
For example, Mincer (1993) shows that relative earnings of college graduates in the US
increased with the aggregate R&D intensity between 1963 and 1987. Krueger (1993) argues
that the wage structure has been changed by the widespread introduction of computers. And
Allen (1998) finds that the schooling wage-premium between 1979 and 1989 rose most in
industries with a greater R&D and high-tech capital.
At the firm and industry level there appears to be no robust positive correlation between
technological change and wages of high human capital workers (e.g. DiNardo and Pischke
(1997), Entorf and Kramarz (1997)). This is not too surprising, however, as skill-biased
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productivity growth at the level of a single firm or industry will translate into increased
demand for human capital but not into wages in a competitive environment.
x. Technological change and employment
To understand the theoretical effect of technological change on employment, assume that a
firm decides to implement a computer-assisted production process. The implementation of this
new process allows the firm to produce the same amount of output with a lower level of
employment, generating a negative employment effect. This translates into a cost reduction
and lower prices. Lower prices may translate into larger demand and therefore output,
generating a positive employment effect. Whether employment is higher before or after the
adoption of the new technology depends on a variety of factors. The positive employment
effect tends to increase with competition in the sector experiencing technological change, the
extent of economies of scale, and the elasticity of demand. These considerations imply that
the relationship between technological change and employment at the firm and industry
level is a priori unclear. Empirical studies on the relationship between employment and
technology have been relatively scarce. Analysing manufacturing industries in the OECD,
Blechinger, Kleinknecht, Licht and Pfeiffer (1998) show that industries with higher R&D
intensity expanded more quickly. Firm level studies provide a wide variety of results from
different countries however. It appears that product innovation has a positive effect on
employment growth in Germany but a negative effect in France (e.g. Entorf and Pohlmeier
(1990), Greenan and Guellac (2000)). Evidence concerning process innovations is also mixed
(e.g. Blanchflower and Burgess (1998), Blechinger et al. (1998)).
xi. Non-market returns to schooling
So far we have only discussed the return to education related to improved labour market
performance. There is a large literature identifying additional non-market returns for
individuals and families (e.g. McMahon (1998)). The main component of these additional
returns is usually taken to be the positive effect of education on own health and on the health
of families headed by better educated individuals. For example, better educated men have a
lower risk of death from heart disease, and children of better educated women have lower
mortality rates (e.g. Feldman et al. (1989)). Some studies argue that health benefits can add
up to 40 percent to the labour market return of schooling (e.g. Wolfe and Zuvekas (1997)).
Another important non-market component of the return to schooling is the efficiency of home
production, including the management of household finances and the education of children.
For example, households headed by more educated individuals achieve higher returns on
financial assets and the children of better educated parents stay longer and do better in school
(e.g. Solomon (1975), Angrist and Levy (1996)). Moreover, better educated individuals are
more efficient learners later in life (e.g. Mincer (1993)). These non-market returns imply that
25
the private and social labour market returns to human capital should be seen as lower bounds
when making investment decisions.
b. Human capital and growth: macroeconomic evidence
This section surveys the macroeconomic evidence on the growth effects of education. After
briefly reviewing the role of human capital in recent theories of growth, we discuss the
specifications most commonly used in empirical work in this area, some econometric issues
that arise in their estimation, and the main results of the literature. A more detailed
literature review is contained in section 3 of the Appendix to this report.9
i. Human capital in growth theory
One of the most distinctive features of the "new" theories of growth developed in recent
years has been the broadening of the relevant concept of capital. While traditional
neoclassical models focused almost exclusively on the accumulation of physical capital
(equipment and structures), more recent contributions have attributed increasing importance to
the accumulation of human capital and productive knowledge and to the interaction between
these two factors.10
Theoretical models of human capital and growth are built around the hypothesis
discussed in section 2, namely that knowledge and skills embodied in humans directly raise
productivity and increase an economy's ability to develop and to adopt new technologies. In
order to explore its implications and open the way for its empirical testing, this basic
hypothesis is generally formalized in one of two (not mutually exclusive) ways. The simplest
one involves introducing the stock of human capital (which will be denoted by H throughout
this report) as an additional input in an otherwise standard production function linking
aggregate output to the stocks of productive inputs (generally employment and physical
capital) and to an index of technical efficiency or total factor productivity (TFP). The second
possibility is to include H in the model as a determinant of the rate of technological progress
(i.e. the rate of growth of TFP). This involves specifying a technical progress function that
may include as additional arguments variables related to R&D investment and the gap
between each country and the world technological frontier. We will refer to the first of these
links between human capital and productivity as level effects (because the stock of human
capital has a direct impact on the level of output) and to the second one as rate effects
(because H affects the growth rate of output through TFP). As will be emphasized later, the
distinction between these two types of effects, while conceptually clear, is often less sharp in
9 This section and parts of section 5 are based on de la Fuente (2002a).
10
 See especially Lucas (1988), Romer (1989), Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1992) and Jones (1996). Some recent studies in this literature draw on earlier work by Uzawa (1965),
Nelson and Phelps (1969) and Welch (1970) among others.
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practice than may appear from the preceding discussion, particularly in models that allow
for the diffusion of technology across countries.
Some recent theoretical models also suggest that the accumulation of human capital may
give rise to important externalities, as some of the benefits of a more educated labour force
will typically "leak out" and generate benefits that cannot be appropriated by those who
undertake the relevant investment in the form of higher earnings, thereby driving a wedge
between the relevant private and social rates of return. Lucas (1988), for example, suggests
that the average stock of human capital at the economy-wide level increases productivity at
the firm level holding the firm's own stock of human capital constant. It is also commonly
assumed that the rate effects of human capital through the technical progress function
include a large externality component because it is difficult to appropriate privately the full
economic value of new ideas. Azariadis and Drazen (1990), and implicitly Lucas (1988) as
well, stress that younger cohorts are likely to benefit from the knowledge and skills
accumulated by their elders, thus generating potentially important intergenerational
externalities that operate both at home and in school. The literature also suggests that
human capital can generate more diffuse "civic" externalities, as an increase in the
educational level of the population may help reduce crime rates or contribute to the
development of more effective institutions.
ii. Empirical formulations
Empirical studies of the productivity effects of human capital (or more broadly, of the
determinants of economic growth) have followed one of two alternative approaches. The first
one involves the specification and estimation of an ad-hoc equation relating growth in total
or per capita output to a set of variables that are thought to be relevant on the basis of
informal theoretical considerations. The second approach is based on the estimation of a
structural relation between the level of output or its growth rate and the relevant
explanatory variables that is derived from an explicit theoretical model built around an
aggregate production function and, possibly, a second function that describes the determinants
of technical progress.
This basic framework for the "structural" analysis of the determinants of growth can give
rise to a large number of empirical specifications. As explained in greater detail in Box 2, the
production function can be estimated directly with the relevant variables expressed in levels
or in growth rates when reliable data are available for the stocks of all the relevant
production inputs. Alternatively, its parameters can be recovered from other specifications
(convergence and steady state equations) that are designed for estimation when only data on
investment flows (rather than factor stocks) are available. These specifications can be
derived from production functions by replacing factor stocks or their growth rates by
convenient approximations constructed using observed investment rates.
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Box 2: Some commonly used growth specifications
____________________________________________________________
Many studies of the determinants of growth assume an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production
function of the form
(1) Yit = Ait Kit
αkHit
αhLit
αl
where Yit denotes the aggregate output of country i at time t, Lit is the level of employment,
Kit the stock of physical capital, Hit  the average stock of human capital per worker, and Ait
an index of technical efficiency or total factor productivity (TFP) which summarizes the
current state of the technology and, possibly, omitted factors such as geographical location,
climate, institutions and endowments of natural resources. The coefficients αi (with i = k, h, l)
measure the elasticity of output with respect to the stocks of the different factors. An increase
of 1% in the stock of human capital per worker, for instance, would increase output by αh%,
holding constant the stocks of the other factors and the level of technical efficiency.
For estimation purposes it is generally convenient to work with (1) in logarithms or in
growth rates. Using lower case letters to denote logarithms, and the combination of lower case
letters and the symbol "∆ " to denote growth rates, this yields the following two
specifications:
(2) yit = ait  + αkkit  + αhhit  + αllit  + εit
(3) ∆yit  = ∆ait  + αk ∆kit  + αh ∆hit  + αl ∆lit  + ∆εit
where εit  and ∆εit  are stochastic disturbances.
One difficulty that arises at this point is that both equations (2) and (3) contain terms
that are not directly observable (in particular the level of TFP, ait, or its growth rate, ∆ait).
To proceed with the estimation, it is necessary to make further assumptions about the
behaviour of these terms. Different assumptions will generate different econometric
specifications. The simplest possibility is to assume that the rate of technical progress is
constant over time and across countries, i.e. that ∆ait = g for all i and t. In this case, g can be
estimated as the regression constant in equation (3) and  ait  is replaced in equation (2) by aio +
gt , where  aio  and g  give rise to country-specific constants and a common trend respectively.
An alternative and more sophisticated approach is to specify ∆ait in equation (3) as a
function of other variables. A relatively general specification of this technical progress
function (that nests those used in the studies reviewed in the Appendix to this report and
allows for rate effects from human capital) would be given by
(4) ∆ait = γio + γbbit + γhHit +γbhHitbit  + γrRDit
where H is the average stock of human capital, RD a measure of R&D expenditure and bit is
some proxy for the technological gap between country i and the world best practice frontier.
When data on factor stocks or their growth rates are not available (or are not considered
reliable), observed investment rates can be used to construct approximations to the variables
that enter equations (2) and (3). These approximations are typically obtained by using a
generalized Solow model in the manner suggested by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). In such
a model, long-term equilibrium values of factor ratios are simple functions of investment rates,
and the behaviour of these ratios away from such an equilibrium can be approximated as a
function of investment rates and initial income per worker. If we are willing to assume that
most countries are reasonably close to their long-run equilibria, equation (2) can be replaced by
an equation relating output per worker to investment rates in physical and human capital.
Otherwise, the equation will also include initial output per worker as an additional regressor
in order to pick up transitional dynamics along the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium.
Two rather standard specifications of the resulting steady state and convergence equations
(which do not allow for rate effects) would be 
(5) qit = aio + gt + 
αk
1-αk-αh
   ln 
skit
δ+g+nit
    +   
αh
1-αk-αh
   ln 
shit
δ+g+nit
and
____________________________________________________________
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Box 2 (continued)
______________________________________________________________________
(6) ∆qit =   g + β 
 

 
αk
1-αk-αh
 ln 
skit
δ+g+nit
  + 
αh
1-αk-αh
 ln 
shit
δ+g+nit
   + β(aio + gt) -  βqit
where sk and sh stand for investment in physical and human capital, measured as a fraction of
GDP, n  for the rate of growth of employment or the labour force and δ for the rate of
depreciation (which is assumed to be the same for both types of capital). The parameter β
measures the speed of convergence towards the long-run equilibrium and can be shown to be a
function of the degree of returns to scale in both types of capital considered jointly and of the
length of the period over which we are taking observations.
So far, we have implicitly assumed that the stock of human capital per worker, H , is
directly observable. In practice, however, what we observe is typically average years of
schooling, YS, and the estimation of the empirical model requires some assumption about the
form of the function relating these two variables, H = g(YS). Substituting this function into
(1), we obtain a reduced-form production function relating Y to YS. To avoid any confusion, we
will refer to the elasticity of this reduced-form production function with respect to years of
schooling as αYS (notice that this parameter will generally be different from αh). Similarly,
when YS replaces H in the technical progress function (4), we will use the notation γYS  for the
rate effects parameter that measures the contribution of an additional year of schooling to
the rate of TFP growth.
A fairly common assumption in the literature about the nature of g() is that H = YS. In this
case, all the equations shown above remain valid, with H replaced by YS and αh replaced by
αYS. A second possibility is to assume that
(7) H = exp (θYS).
This is often called a Mincerian specification because it is consistent with the functional form
commonly used in the microeconometric wage equations pioneered by Mincer (1974). (See Box 1
above). In this case, the exponential in (7) undoes the logarithm in the Cobb-Douglas and the
equations above have to be modified accordingly. In particular, logs of H  must be replaced by
levels of YS and growth rates of H by average changes in YS. Notice that if we embed (7) into
the Cobb-Douglas function given in (2), the coefficient of YS in the resulting equation, ρ = αhθ,
will measure the percentage increase in output that follows from an increase of one year in
average school attainment. We will refer to ρ as the aggregate or macroeconomic Mincerian
return to schooling. As will become clear later, this variable must be distinguished from the
"proper" rate of return to schooling, which will be defined and calculated in section 5.c.
______________________________________________________________________
In what follows we will be particularly interested in the values of three technical
parameters that can be recovered from structural specifications. The first two are alternative
measures of the intensity of level effects: the elasticity of aggregate output with respect to
average educational attainment (αYS) and what we will call the macroeconomic or aggregate
Mincerian return to schooling (ρ). The first of these parameters measures the percentage
increase in output that would result from a 1% increase in average schooling, and the second
one the percentage increase in output that would follow from an increase of one year in
average attainment. We can go from αYS to ρ by dividing the first coefficient by average
attainment in years and vice versa. The third parameter of interest (γYS) measures the
intensity of rate effects, i.e. the contribution of one additional year of schooling to the growth
rate of total factor productivity.
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iii. Econometric issues
As we have already noted, measurement error is always an issue in the literature we are
reviewing because the years of schooling variable used in most empirical applications is
surely a rather imperfect measure of human capital. But even abstracting from this, poor data
quality is likely to be an important problem because most existing data sets on cross-country
educational attainment seem to contain a considerable amount of noise arising from various
inconsistencies in the primary data used to construct them.11 Such noise can generally be
expected to introduce a downward bias in the estimated human capital coefficients (i.e. a
tendency to underestimate their values) because it generates spurious variability in the
measured stock of human capital that will not be matched by changes in productivity.
Krueger and Lindhal (2001) discuss some techniques that can be used to construct
approximate measures of the quality of different schooling data sets and to correct for
measurement error. The information content of a noisy indicator of human capital (H) can be
measured by its reliability ratio, defined as the ratio of signal to signal plus measurement
noise in the data. Estimates of this ratio can be obtained when several measures of schooling
are available, and the results can be used to estimate the size of the biases generated by errors
in measurement. It turns out, in particular, that the expected value of the coefficient obtained
by standard methods (ordinary least squares) when H is measured with error will be the
product of the true value of the parameter and an "attenuation" coefficient that increases
with the reliability ratio of the H series used in the estimation.12
Using these techniques, we estimate (see section 2.a of the Appendix) that the average
reliability ratio of the available cross-country schooling data sets ranges, for a sample of
industrial countries, between 10% and 60% depending on how the data are measured (i.e. in
levels, logarithms or growth rates). This implies that the coefficients estimated in most
empirical studies, which do not correct for this problem, are likely to suffer from very
significant downward biases and will underestimate the true impact of schooling on growth.
The bias will tend to be smaller for estimates obtained using the data in levels or logs, but is
likely to be extremely large in specifications that use growth rates of schooling calculated
over relatively short periods.13
A second standard concern when we are trying to estimate the impact of education on
productivity is that reverse causation from income to schooling may generate an upward bias in
the estimated coefficient of human capital in the production function. The nature of the
problem is discussed in greater detail in Box 3, but it essentially arises because the feedback
11
 See section 2 of the Appendix for a discussion of the data sets most commonly used in empirical growth
analyses.
12
 When H is the only regressor, this coefficient is the reliability ratio itself. Otherwise, the error is larger
and increases with the R2 of a regression of H on the rest of the explanatory variables in the productivity
equation.
13
 The average reliability ratio is only 0.278 for the data in quinquennial growth rates, and 0.098 for level
differences taken at the same frequency.
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Box 3: Reverse causation
______________________________________________________________________
Technically, the source of the reverse causation bias is that the feedback effects of income
on education can generate a correlation between schooling and the disturbance of the
production function, thereby violating the conditions that are necessary for the consistency of
least squares estimators.  To illustrate the nature of the problem, suppose that we are trying
to estimate a per capita production function in logs
(1) qit = ai + gt + αk(kit - lit) + αhhit + εit
where q is log output per worker and the rest of the notation is as in Box 2, and that the
demand for education is an increasing function of q  given by
(2) hit = Xitβ + ηqit + νit
where X is a vector of other relevant variables and εit and νit are disturbance terms. In this
setup, a positive shock to income in the first equation (a positive value of εit) will increase (qit
and hence) hit through the second equation. As a result, the regressor hit will be positively
correlated with the disturbance of the production function and its coefficient will be biased
upward.
In practice, things are not necessarily quite as bad as the previous discussion may suggest
because average schooling is a stock variable that evolves slowly over time and the level of
income should only affect it with a lag through changes in enrollment rates. Thus, we should
probably replace equation (2) by something like the following system
(3) eit = Xitβ + ηqit + ϕEtgit+k + νit
(4) hit = g(eit-1, ... , eit-κ, Z)
where eit  stands for the enrollment rate and the unspecified function g() describes the
determination of hit as a function of past enrollments. Notice that we are making the
enrollment rate a function of the expected future rate of technical progress (Etgit+k) because, as
Bils and Klenow (2000) show, increases in this variable increase the return to schooling and
therefore its demand. Notice that with this specification, the problem disappears. Now, a
positive shock to income in (1) will increase the enrollment ratio through (3), but this will not
feed back into h until some time in the future, implying that hit can still be uncorrelated with
the contemporaneous disturbance in equation (1).
It would be too hasty, however, to dismiss the problem in this way, for it may very well
arise in many of the specifications used in the literature, even when direct measures of
educational stocks are used in the estimation rather than enrollment rates. For instance, the
omission of fixed effects in the production function in levels is likely to cause trouble even in
the model described by equations (3) and (4). In this case, the composite error term in (1)
would be of the form (ai + εit) and its time invariant component (the fixed effect) would
indeed affect hit because it will have influenced enrollment in all previous periods. Hence, hit
is very likely to be correlated with (ai + εit), which will again bias its coefficient.
Reverse causation can also be a problem when the production function is estimated in
differences (as is often done, partly to remove the fixed effects bias). We now have
(5) ∆qit = gi + αk∆(kit - lit) + αh∆hit + ∆εit
where we are allowing for the possibility that the rate of technical progress, g, may differ
across countries. If equation (5) is well specified, its disturbance term ∆εit should only contain
true random shocks to the growth rate that cannot be anticipated by agents and should not
therefore feed back to ∆hit  through (3) and (4). But if this is not the case and the error term
contains some systematic component of the growth rate that agents can anticipate (e.g. a fixed
country effect in rates of technical progress), we may well find that ∆hit is again correlated
with the (enlarged) disturbance, particularly if the period over which we are computing
growth rates is long enough for changes in enrollments to affect the stock of schooling of the
labour force.
______________________________________________________________________
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effects of income on the demand for education can make it difficult to determine to what extent
the observed correlation between income and schooling reflects the fact that rich countries
demand more education for consumption purposes as well as the contribution of education to
productivity that we want to measure.
Since the upward bias arising from reverse causation will work to offset the downward
bias from measurement error and may even be larger, there is always some uncertainty about
the net bias that remains in any given estimate of the relevant human capital coefficients.
While we are not aware of any simple way of estimating the size of the reverse causation
bias, the discussion in Box 3 suggests that it may not be very large, particularly in models that
control for TFP differences across countries and/or for the determinants of the rate of
technological progress and that make use of variables measured in levels or in growth rates
calculated over relatively short periods. The main reason for this cautious optimism is that
average schooling is a stock variable that evolves slowly over time and should be affected by
the level of income only with a considerable lag following changes in enrollment rates (which
should indeed be sensitive to income levels). Hence, while reverse causation is likely to be a
serious problem when we consider average growth rates over long periods, changes in income
over shorter periods should not have time to feed through to schooling stocks. A careful
specification of other aspects of the model is also important because the reverse causation
problem arises when the residual of the productivity or growth equation is not a "clean"
random disturbance but contains systematic components of income or the growth rate that will
enter the enrollment equation describing the demand for education because they can be
anticipated by individuals. If such contamination can be avoided by controlling for all or most
of the relevant factors, the model should yield more accurate estimates of the effects of
schooling on productivity.
The preceding discussion suggests that the choice of specification involves a complex
tradeoff between different econometric problems, for some of the things that may be done to
reduce the reverse causation bias are likely to increase measurement error and vice versa. An
additional consideration has to do with the ability of different specifications to capture
indirect productivity effects from human capital that involve uncertain and possibly long
delays. Specifications that make use of growth rates computed over relatively short periods
are unlikely to pick up what we have called rate effects unless these start to work almost
immediately, which seems rather implausible. In order to estimate these indirect effects, it
may be preferable to work with average growth rates over longer periods or with the data in
levels, but it is difficult to be sure that the higher human capital coefficients typically
generated by these specifications14 are not the result of reverse causation bias.
14
 See for instance Topel (1999) and Krueger and Lindhal (2001).
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iv. A brief review of the empirical evidence
Section 3 of the Appendix to this report contains a detailed survey of the macroeconomic
literature on growth and human capital. The picture that emerges from this review of the
empirical evidence is somewhat mixed but ultimately encouraging. As we have seen,
academic economists have traditionally been inclined to consider educational expenditure a
key component of national investment with a substantial payoff in terms of output growth,
and have often assigned to the accumulation of human capital a central role in formal models,
particularly in the recent literature on endogenous growth. This optimism seemed to be
confirmed by a first round of cross-country empirical studies of the determinants of growth,
where a variety of educational indicators were consistently found to have the expected
positive effect.15 A second round of such studies, however, produced rather disappointing
results using more sophisticated econometric techniques and even led some researchers to
explicitly question the link between education and growth.16 In recent years, the evidence
seems to be accumulating that such negative results were largely due to poor data and various
econometric problems.17 Recent studies that make use of improved data sets or allow for
measurement error strongly suggest that investment in education does have a substantial
impact on productivity growth.18
Our review of the empirical literature shows that it has proved surprisingly difficult to
separate level from rate effects, with different studies reaching opposite conclusions about
their relative significance. This may be partly an estimation problem, as the high
correlation between schooling levels and growth rates and of these variables with other
regressors can make it difficult to untangle their separate effects in a growth regression.19 But
there are also plausible theoretical specifications in which the two effects may be difficult
to identify separately. In particular the distinction between them tends to become blurred
once we allow for technological diffusion. In this context, an increase in human capital does
make for faster technological change, but this effect gradually exhausts itself as the country
comes closer to the world technological frontier and TFP growth stabilizes. As a result, the
rate effect becomes a level effect over the medium or long run and, if convergence to the
"technological equilibrium" is sufficiently fast, the two effects cannot be separated.
15
 See among others Landau (1983), Baumol et al (1989), Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1992).
16
 Studies that report largely negative findings include Kyriacou (1991), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994),
Pritchett (1999, whose first version is from 1995), Islam (1995) and Caselli et al (1996).
17
 One of these problems is that the fixed effects specifications used in most of these studies waste all the
information contained in the cross-sectional variation of the data. See Section 3 of the Appendix.
18
 See for instance de la Fuente and Doménech (2000), Krueger and Lindhal (2001), Cohen and Soto (2001)
and Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001).
19
 For instance, the correlation between the log and the growth rate of years of schooling is -0.6 in de la
Fuente and Doménech's (2001) data set. Using Spanish regional data, de la Fuente (2002b) finds evidence of
both level and rate effects in a specification in differences that allows for technological diffusion; the rate
effects, however, lose their significance when regional fixed effects are introduced. The author attributes
this finding to the high correlation (0.92) between the human capital variable in levels used in this
specification and a set of regional dummies .
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As the previous discussion suggests, there remains considerable uncertainty about the size
of the relevant macroeconomic human capital coefficients and about the relative importance
of level and rate effects. The range of existing estimates is extremely large even when we
restrict ourselves to recent studies that make use of the latest available data sets and find
evidence of positive growth effects. In Section 5a we will draw on our discussion of the
relevant econometric and specification issues and on the detailed literature review contained
in the Appendix to try to identify a plausible range of parameter values. What we consider to
be the most plausible estimates in the literature suggest that, holding other things equal, an
additional year of average school attainment increases the level of aggregate productivity
by around 5% on impact and by a further 5% in the long run. This second effect reflects the
contribution of human capital to technological progress, i.e. to the development and adoption
of new technologies and to the continued improvement of existing production processes.
So far we have concentrated on studies that have tried to measure the contribution of
increases in the quantity of schooling to productivity growth. Some interesting recent
research, however, provides strong evidence that the quality of schooling may be just as
important for growth as its quantity, if not more. These studies include mean national scores in
standardized achievement tests as explanatory variables in standard growth equations and
find large and significant productivity effects. Some of these studies have also analyzed the
relationship between student achievement and school expenditure with mixed results.
Measures of school resources such as pupil to teacher ratios and average teacher salaries are
found to have a significant positive effect on performance in some studies but not in others.20
Another important recent finding is that most countries with high average performance of
students approaching the end of compulsory schooling are also very successful in raising the
performance of students from the most disadvantaged backgrounds (OECD (2001c)). Hence,
there is scope for education policies that both raise the average quality of human capital and
improve social cohesion.
v. Externalities at the city and regional level
As we mentioned earlier, comparisons between micro and macroeconomic estimates of the
Mincerian returns to schooling may provide a way to assess whether there are externalities
associated with the accumulation of human capital. One problem with such comparisons, in
addition to those noted above, is that both types of studies generally use quite different data
sources. A series of recent studies sidesteps this problem by using the same data source to
estimate the returns to schooling within a given country both at the individual level and at
the level of cities or regions. (See for instance Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and Rudd (2000) at
the regional level, and Rauch (1993), Ciccone and Peri (2000) and Moretti (2000) at the city
level).
20
 See Lee and Lee (1995), Barro (2000), Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Lee and Barro (2001).
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These studies estimate human capital externalities in two steps. The first step consists of
estimating the wage-differential between identical individuals working in different cities or
regions. This is done using standard Mincerian wage regressions. The second step relates
estimated wage differentials between identical individuals in different cities or regions to
differences in the average level of human capital between cities or regions. If wage-
differentials can partly be explained by differences in the average level of human capital,
then these studies conclude that there are human capital externalities. Because of the lack of
appropriate data, none of these studies is done at the country-level.
The findings in this literature range from no human capital externalities to moderate and
large externalities. For example, Rauch (1993) finds that a one-year increase in average years
of schooling at the city-level is associated with an external effect on city productivity of 3
percent. This finding may however be driven by high-productivity cities attracting high
skilled workers, and not by human capital externalities. In fact, Acemoglu and Angrist (2000),
Ciccone and Peri (2000) and Rudd (2000) do not find any externalities when they take this
possibility into account. Moretti (2000), however, argues that there are large externalities to
the share of college-educated workers in US cities. Still, the weight of the evidence suggests
that human capital externalities are unlikely to explain a significant part of regional
productivity differences.
As all of these studies are done at the city or regional level, they are likely to miss
externalities that operate at the country level. For example, suppose that there are human
capital externalities at the country level because a greater supply of high human capital
workers increases the demand for new technologies and hence the incentives to invest in R&D.
These externalities will not be picked up at the level of cities or regions because new
technologies are developed for larger markets. Human capital externalities at the country
level must therefore be assessed by comparing estimates of the effect of human capital on
individual wages with estimates of its effect on country level productivity.
4. Social capital and growth
Social capital as a determinant of economic growth has received much attention in the last
decade. It is important to understand at the outset, however, that social capital research is
still at its beginnings and that it should be seen as a collection of suggestive arguments and
pieces of empirical evidence, rather than as a set of conclusions that can be of direct use in the
formulation of economic policy.
The term social capital was rendered popular by the contributions of Coleman (1988, 1990)
and Putnam (1993, 1995) and by now the World Bank (2002) has a website with an entire
electronic library on the subject. There are many subtle aspects to defining social capital. For
our purpose it is sufficient to see social capital as the norms and social relations embedded in
the social structure of a group of people that enables the group or individuals participating in
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it to achieve desired goals. This definition misses what is sometimes called individual social
capital, which are the (social) skills that enable an individual to reap market and non-
market returns from interaction with others. These skills might best be seen as a part of the
individual’s human capital.
Knack and Keefer (1997) examine various possible empirical proxies for social capital and
assess their impact on economic growth at the country level. They discuss two main
relationships: between trust and civic norms on the one hand and economic growth on the
other, and between associational activity and growth. Trust at the country level is basically
measured as the percentage of people responding affirmatively to the following World Value
Survey question: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ To capture the strength of norms of civic
cooperation, they construct a variable based on answers to various questions about how
individuals evaluate anti-civic behavior. Their main finding is that trust and civic
cooperation are associated with stronger economic performance, but that associational
activity is unrelated to economic growth. This result is quite robust in their sample but it is
still unclear whether it also holds in OECD countries (e.g. Helliwell (1996), Zak and Knack
(2001)). Temple and Johnson (1998) show that indexes of ‘social capability’ for the early
1960s, adapted from the work of Adelman and Morris (1967), are good predictors of long run
growth for a wide set of developing countries. La Porta et al. (1999) find that social capital
improves government performance, including the quality of the bureaucracy and the judicial
system. In a study on the development of secondary education in the United States, Goldin and
Katz (1999) argue that social capital affects and is affected by human capital accumulation.
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2000) use data on Italian regions to show that social capital
enhances financial development and access to credit.21
What determines social capital (or how is it accumulated)? A full answer to this question
is not available, but there are some suggestions. For example, DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999)
argue that geographical mobility reduces individual incentives to participate in social
capital accumulation, and Alesina and La Ferrara (2000a) find that participation in
associational activities like religious groups, sport groups, hobby clubs, etc. is higher when
income inequality and racial segmentation are lower. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999)
document that more ethnically diverse jurisdictions in the United States devote lower shares
of spending to core public goods like education and roads, which is consistent with the idea
that ethnic diversity translates into less social capital. There are also some studies on the
determinants of trust. Knack and Keefer (1997) find that trust and norms of civic cooperation
are stronger in countries with formal institutions that effectively protect property and
21
 Besides Putnam's seminal contribution (Putnam 1993a), these are the only two empirical studies on the
role of social capital at the regional level that we are aware of. The scarcity of work in this area is due to
the fact that there is very little data on institutional quality at the regional level.
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contractual rights, and in countries that are less polarized along lines of class or ethnicity.
Helliwell and Putnam (1999) document that higher average education increases trust.
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000b) sketch five broad factors influencing how much people trust
others: 1) individual culture, traditions and religion; 2) how long an individual has lived in a
community with a stable composition; 3) recent personal history of misfortune; 4) the
perception of being part of a discriminated group; 5) several characteristics of the composition
of one’s community, including its racial and income heterogeneity. Glaeser et al. (2000)
combine survey and experimental data to separately identify the determinants of trust and of
trustworthiness. Two of their findings are that a smaller social distance among individuals,
for instance due to joint group membership or the same ‘race’ or nationality, increases both
trust and trustworthiness.
Combining the positive effect of social capital on institutional quality and economic
growth with the determinants of social capital suggests that human capital policies that
reduce ex-ante inequality as well as the social distance between individuals, i.e. that
increase social cohesion, are likely to improve economic performance.
5. Some tentative conclusions
The literature surveyed in section 3 and in the Appendix to this report provides a broad
range of estimates of the coefficients that measure the contribution of human capital to
individual earnings and to aggregate productivity. In this section we attempt to narrow this
range by identifying an interval of plausible values for the relevant micro and macroeconomic
parameters. These figures are then used to discuss the contribution of human capital to growth
and to cross-country income disparities in a sample of industrial countries, and to construct
estimates of the private and social rates of return to schooling from which some tentative
policy conclusions are drawn.
a. A plausible range of parameter estimates
On the whole, the range of variation of existing estimates of the Mincerian returns to
schooling is considerably smaller at the microeconomic than at the macroeconomic level.
While results vary significantly across countries and periods for reasons that have already
been discussed, there is less uncertainty in the microeconomic literature about the extent to
which estimates for a given sample may be biased in an upward or a downward direction by
different econometric problems. There is widespread agreement, for instance, that the
measurement error and ability biases roughly offset each other, and that reverse causation is
unlikely to be a major problem because higher wages are more likely to increase the demand
for education of the children of currently active workers than that of the workers themselves.
A recent study by Harmon, Walker and Westergaard-Nielsen (HW&W, 2001) provides an
estimate of the individual Mincerian returns to schooling parameter (θ) in fifteen European
37
countries (mostly EU members) that is based on a meta analysis of a large number of wage
equation estimates undertaken or collected as part of a large research project on the returns to
education in Europe. These authors report that the average value of θ in Europe is 6.5%22 and
that country means range from around 4.5% to 10%, with the Scandinavian countries and Italy
at the lower end of the distribution and the UK and Ireland at the top.
 As we have already noted, wage equation coefficients have to be treated with some
precaution when interpreted as estimates of the technical parameter that measures the
contribution of schooling to productivity because it is likely that payscales will reflect labour
market institutions and social norms as well as relative productivities. Making some
allowance for the distortions created by wage-setting practices, it may be expected that the
true value of the Mincerian parameter will lie somewhere between HW&W's central
estimate of 6.5% and their average estimate of 9% for the Anglo-Saxon countries that appear
to have the most flexible labour markets in Europe. Table 1 gathers these two benchmark
estimates of the individual "raw" returns to schooling (θ) and the values that result after the
adjustment for physical capital that is required to make them comparable to the relevant
macroeconomic returns to schooling coefficient (ρ).23
Table 1: Benchmark estimates of the individual Mincerian returns parameter (θ)
and values adjusted for comparison with macroeconomic estimates (ρ)
____________________________________________
raw
θ
adjusted
ρ
min (average) 6.50% 4.33%
max (Anglo-Saxon countries) 9.00% 6.00%
____________________________________________
At the macroeconomic level, identifying a plausible range of values for the relevant
parameters is a much more difficult task because the available estimates vary from negative
to very large positive values. Drawing on our discussion of the literature, we will argue that
the elasticity of output with respect to average years of schooling (αYS)  can be expected to lie
between 0.394 and 0.535 and that the rate effects coefficient (γYS)  should be between 0.0% and
0.9%. The first set of figures implies that the Mincerian level effects parameter (ρ) can be
expected to fall between 3.98% and 5.41% for the case of the average  EU country in 1990, as
shown in Table 2.24
22
 This is very similar to the average estimate of 6.8% for the OECD countries reported by Psacharopoulos
(1994).
23 We estimate ρ as (1-αk)θ with αk = 1/3. See Section 3 for a discussion of the nature of the adjustment.
24
 This calculation assumes that the aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas in years of schooling,
i.e. that H = YS. The value of ρ is obtained by dividing the relevant estimate of αYS by average 1990 school
attainment in years in the sample of 14 EU countries (all but Luxembourg) for which de la Fuente and
Doménech (2001) provide data.
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Table 2: Benchmark estimates of the macroeconomic level and rate parameters
___________________________
level effects
ρ
rate effects
γY S
min 3.98% 0.00%
max 5.41% 0.90%
___________________________
A detailed discussion of how these figures are obtained from various estimates in the
literature is included in section 3f of the Appendix. To arrive at this range of values, we
disregard the most pessimistic results in the literature as the result of poor data quality. Our
lower bound estimate comes from an updated version of de la Fuente and Doménech (2000) that
makes use of a recently constructed data set which appears to have a relatively high signal
to noise ratio. This paper estimates a production function using growth rates calculated over
five-year intervals and contains a fairly complete specification of the technical progress
function that allows for technological diffusion and for country fixed effects that should help
control for omitted variables such as R&D investment. As a result of both the high frequency
of the observations and the specification used, these estimates are very unlikely to suffer
from a significant upward bias arising from reverse causation. It is more likely that they will
underestimate the true returns to schooling because of remaining measurement error and
because the shortness of the period over which the growth rates are computed can make it
difficult to detect productivity effects that may involve considerable lags -- as is likely to be
the case with the technology-related rate effects.
A conservative correction for measurement error brings de la Fuente and Doménech's
estimate of the value of ρ in the EU to 5.41%.25 Since this figure is well within the range of
the (adjusted) microeconometric estimates shown in Table 1, we will use it as an upper bound
on the likely value of the level effects.26 Hence, coefficients of schooling variables in growth
25
 The correction is conservative because it is based on the estimated reliability ratio for this schooling
series (0.736) without taking into account the further adjustment that would be required because of the
correlation between schooling and other regressors included in the equation. The full correction would
lower the attenuation factor to 0.2 and increase five-fold the original estimate of the parameter. On the
other hand, it is very likely that this procedure will lead to the overestimation of the true parameter, as
measurement error in the other regressors is likely to partially offset the downward bias on schooling.
26
 An additional reason for this choice is that, under the assumption that the reduced-form production
function is Cobb-Douglas in schooling (i.e. that H = YS) the output elasticity that corresponds to this
estimate (αYS  = 0.535) implies that the returns to schooling account for 82% of labour income. Under the
same assumption, any significantly higher estimate of ρ would imply a negative coefficient for raw labour
in the aggregate production function and a negative share of this factor in labour compensation. The Cobb-
Douglas assumption, however, is crucial for this argument because it implies that αYS  = αh (see Box 2).
With a Mincerian specification (H = Exp (θYS)), the share of skill in total labour compensation cannot be
inferred from the parameters of the reduced-form production function relating output to schooling. The
reason is that, while this share still depends on αh, this parameter is now different from αYS and cannot be
identified separately because it enters the reduced-form production function multiplying θ.
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equations that imply higher values of ρ must be picking up something else than the direct
productivity or level effects that are likely to translate into higher wages.
There are essentially two possibilities: one is the upward bias from reverse causation, and
the other what we have called rate effects, i.e. the indirect contribution of human capital to
growth via faster technical progress that constitutes the most plausible source of externalities
linked to education.27 The pattern of results in the studies that produce large estimates of ρ
suggests that both factors are at work. Schooling coefficients are generally larger when they
come from steady state level equations (where reverse causation can be a serious problem if we
do not control for differences in TFP levels across countries) or from differenced specifications
that use growth rates computed over long periods (where again there is greater danger of
reverse causation bias as there is time for changes in enrollments to affect schooling stocks).
On the other hand, these specifications are also more likely to pick up productivity effects
that involve long gestation lags, and there are reasons to expect that not all of the observed
increase in the coefficients is due to reverse causation. In particular, some of the relevant
studies that estimate steady state equations do include proxies for TFP or other control
variables that should at least reduce the endogeneity bias (e.g. Cohen and Soto (2001) and
Barro (2000)), and one of them (Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001)) estimates very high
schooling coefficients with annual data using an error correction specification that probably
permits a better characterization of long-term relationships by allowing short-term
deviations from them.
The range of values shown in Table 2 for the rate effects parameter, γYS, is obtained by
imposing the assumption that αYS = 0.535 and solving for the value of γYS that is consistent
with the schooling coefficients obtained in different studies, when these coefficients are
interpreted within the context of a model allowing for technological diffusion (see Box 4
below and Section 3f of the Appendix). The coefficient estimates we use are taken from the
studies cited above and from a paper by Jones (1996) that attempts to estimate directly the
rate effects (essentially by assuming that there are no level effects). The values of γY S
obtained in this manner range from 0.24% in Cohen and Soto (2001) to 0.87% in Barro (2000).
b. Implications for growth and cross country disparities in the OECD
How important is human capital as a source of growth and cross-country productivity
disparities? In this section we will provide a tentative answer to this question for a sample of
21 industrial countries. In particular, we will calculate the contribution of human capital to i)
the observed growth in productivity (measured by output per employed worker) over the
period 1960-1990 and ii) the productivity differential with the sample average in 1990,
27
 A third possibility is that schooling may act as a proxy for R&D investment, which is highly skill
intensive. While this is not exactly the idea behind the rate effects, a positive coefficient arising through this
mechanism would also be consistent with the view that human capital contributes to the creation of useful
knowledge.
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Box 4: Measuring the contribution of schooling to growth and cross-country disparities
______________________________________________________________________
The contribution of human capital to growth in country i (chi) is calculated using an
aggregate production function (which is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas in average years of
schooling, YS) and a technical progress function that allows for rate effects from human
capital and technological diffusion. Hence, chi will have two components in the general case.
The first one captures level effects and is given by
(1) chli = αYS∆ysi
where αYS is the elasticity of output with respect to average schooling and ∆ysi is the
observed growth rate of average years of schooling in country i over the sample period. The
second component captures the contribution of rate effects and is calculated using a technical
progress function of the form
(2) ∆xit = γio - λxit + γYSYSit
where xit is the log of country i's TFP level at time t, measured as a fraction of the world
technological frontier. For this calculation we assume that in 1960 all countries were in the
technological steady states (relative to the world frontier) corresponding to their estimated
schooling levels in 1955. These are obtained by projecting  backward the value of YS in 1960
using the growth rate of this variable between 1960 and 1965. These initial values are then
projected forward until 1990 using equation (3) and the values of YS observed during the
sample period. Finally, the annualized difference between the initial and final values of xit
is used as our estimate of the contribution of rate effects to growth in country i.
The share of human capital in growth in country i is then given by the ratio ai =chi/∆qi
where ∆qi is the observed value of the growth rate of output per worker over the period 1960-
90. To reduce the weight of outliers, rather than computing the simple average of this
quantity across countries, we estimate a regression of the form
(3) chi = a∆qi + ei
where ei is a disturbance term. The coefficient a ≅ chi/∆qi measures the fraction of observed
growth that can be attributed to human capital in the case of a typical country in the sample.
To measure the contribution of human capital to productivity differentials in 1990 we
proceed in a similar way. We define country i's relative productivity (qreli) as the difference
between country i's log output per employed worker in 1990 and the average value of the same
variable in the sample and regress human capital's estimated contribution to qreli on qreli
itself to obtain a coefficient, analogous to a in equation (3), that measures the fraction of the
productivity differential that can be attributed to human capital in a typical country in the
sample. As before, the contribution of human capital to relative productivity will have two
components that reflect level and rate effects respectively. The first component is computed
by multiplying αYS by the country's relative level of schooling (measured in log differences
with the (geometric) sample average) and the second is obtained as the difference between
the 1990 value of xi estimated above and the sample average of the same variable.
______________________________________________________________________
working in both cases with a "typical" OECD economy. This fictional typical economy is
constructed by averaging across countries the contributions of human capital to the variables
of interest using regression-based weights so as to reduce the impact of outliers (see Box 4).
The exercise will be repeated for the range of values of the schooling coefficients identified in
the previous section. This will allow us to illustrate the implications of the different
parameter estimates available in the literature in terms of magnitudes that are easy to
interpret, and may serve as a check on the plausibility of these estimates. All our
calculations are made with the data set used in the updated version of de la Fuente and
Doménech (2000) and these authors' estimates of the parameters of the production and
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technical progress functions (except in the case of the schooling coefficients, which are
allowed to vary over the entire range of values discussed above).
Figure 3: Percentage of growth in output per worker during 1960-90
explained by human capital in a typical OECD country
as a function of the rate effects parameter
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Figure 4: Percentage of disparities in output per worker in 1990
explained by human capital in a typical OECD country
as a function of the rate effects parameter
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Figures 3 and 4 show the share of human capital in observed growth and in the
productivity differential with the sample average ("relative productivity," from now on) in
the case of a typical OECD country. Both shares are shown as functions of the assumed value
of the rate effects parameter, γYS. The vertical segment of each curve, drawn along the
vertical axis, corresponds to the range of values implied by our maximum and minimum
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estimates of the  level effects parameter. If we consider only level effects, human capital
accounts for between 11.31% and 15.36% of productivity growth over 1960-90 and for between
19.52% and 26.51% of the productivity differential with the sample average in 1990. These
are respectable figures, and they increase rapidly when the contribution of the rate effects is
added, reaching 33.71% of growth and 79.10% of relative productivity for γYS = 0.9%. These
results indicate that human capital is relatively more important in accounting for remaining
productivity disparities than in explaining past growth. The reason for this is that the stock
of physical capital has grown more rapidly than average years of schooling and has
converged at a faster pace across countries, thereby reducing the contribution of this factor to
observed productivity disparities.
Table 3: Immediate sources of productivity growth
and cross country productivity differentials
________________________________________
contribution of:
1960-90
growth
rates
1990
re la t ive
l eve l s
physical capital 49.39% 38.02%
schooling (level effect) 15.36% 26.51%
total k + ys level 64.75% 64.53%
rest =  due to TFP 35.25% 35.47%
________________________________________
- Note: Shares of different factors in observed growth and relative productivity in a typical OECD country
as defined in Box 4.
 Following Bils and Klenow (2000), the following calculation may be helpful in narrowing
down the plausible range of values of the rate effects parameter. Subtracting from observed
productivity growth and from relative productivity the contribution of physical capital and
(the upper bound on) the level effects from human capital, we obtain the share of total factor
productivity (TFP) in these variables which, as shown in Table 3, is around one third in both
cases. Figure 5 then plots the contribution of rate effects to growth and to relative
productivity as a fraction of the estimated TFP share. A "large" value of either of these
ratios will render the underlying rate effects coefficient suspect. For instance, the finding that
rate effects are greater than observed total TFP growth would imply that other components of
this variable (which would capture among other things the contribution of R&D investment)
must have declined over time, which seems rather implausible. A similar finding in the
cross-section dimension would imply that the component of TFP levels not related to human
capital would have to be negatively correlated with labour productivity which, again, seems
unlikely. Turning to Figure 5, the growth decomposition does not help narrow the range of
values of γYS as even the most optimistic estimates available in the literature imply that
human capital accounts for less than half of the observed growth in TFP. On the other hand,
the cross-section relative productivity comparison suggests that we should rule out estimates
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of γYS greater than 0.6%, and that values of this parameter over 0.3-0.4% are unlikely
because they would imply that more than half of the observed cross-country TFP differentials
are induced by human capital.28
Figure 5: Impact of the rate effects from human capital
as a % of the total contribution of TFP to growth and relative productivity
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c. Rates of return to schooling and some policy implications
In this section we will compute the "proper" rates of return to schooling implied by the
micro and macroeconomic parameter estimates discussed above. This calculation is necessary
in order to turn our estimates of technical parameters into measures of the net private and
social economic benefits of schooling that can be compared with each other (by combining
level and rate effects into a single indicator) and with the returns on alternative assets. As we
have already noted, such comparisons can yield information that will be of interest for policy
formulation because they may alert us to under or overinvestment in education, or to the
existence of externalities that may call for corrective action.
Box 5 discusses the methodology used for the calculation of these rates of return. We
compute the internal rate of return on schooling, defined as the discount rate that makes the
28 It should be noted that not all analysts would agree with this criterion. Wössman (2000), for instance,
performs a similar levels accounting exercise with a Mincerian measure of the stock of human capital that
corrects for quality differences using an indicator constructed by Hanushek and Kimko on the basis of
international test scores (see section 3.e of the Appendix). He finds that practically all differences in output
per worker across OECD countries  are explained by human capital (leaving a negative share for TFP that
roughly offsets the share of physical capital). While Wössman argues that this result should be taken at face
value, we think it is too "optimistic" because it leaves virtually no room for other factors that are likely to
be important sources of productivity disparities.
   It should also be noted that a value of αk somewhat lower than the one used in our computations would
still be consistent with national accounts data on factor shares (particularly when capital income is
corrected for the earnings of self-employed workers). A lower value of this parameter will reduce the share
of physical capital in growth and productivity differentials and raise that of TFP, thus leaving more room
for human capital. For plausible values of αk, however, this would not greatly affect our conclusions.
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net present value of the increase in earnings generated by a marginal change in schooling
equal to the present value of the relevant stream of costs. We distinguish between gross and
net rates of return. Gross rates of return are obtained by ignoring the direct costs of schooling
(but not its opportunity costs in terms of foregone earnings), while net rates of return take into
account the relevant direct costs (either those paid directly by the individual or the sum of
the former and government educational expenditures). Our estimates of direct costs are based
on recent data on total and government expenditure on secondary and higher education in the
average EU country and try to approximate the cost of a marginal increase in enrollments,
which would have to come at the upper secondary and university levels since attendance at
lower levels is already compulsory in these countries.
Box 5: The rate of return to schooling
______________________________________________________________________
Consider an individual who goes to school the first S years of his adult life and retires at
time T. If each year of schooling has a direct cost c, the net present value (at time zero) of
earnings over his working life is given by
(1) V(S) = 
  
A t f S e dtrt
S
T
( ) ( ) −∫   − −∫ c t e dtrtS ( )0
where labour income at time t is given by the product of a technical efficiency index A(t) and
a function f(S) that increases with schooling. The net marginal value of schooling will be
given by the derivative of this function, V'(S). By setting this derivative equal to zero and
solving the resulting equation for the value of the discount rate, r, we will obtain an estimate
of the proper rate of return to schooling.
We will use this approach to compute the individual and social rates of return to schooling
distinguishing between gross and net rates of return as defined in the text. When we apply
this procedure to an individual to compute the private rate of return, we will consider
technical progress to be exogenous (i.e. assume that the evolution of A(t) is not affected by the
individual's schooling choice). To compute the social rate of return, we will apply the same
procedure to a hypothetical average individual. This must be regarded as an approximation
because the computation implicitly assumes that a one-year increase in average attainment
will be obtained by immediately sending the entire labour force to school for a year (rather
than by gradually raising the attainment of younger cohorts). When computing social rates of
return, we will allow for rate effects (i.e. assume that the average value of S in the aggregate
can have an effect on technical progress). In this case, an additional term must also be added
to V(S) in equation (1) above to capture the impact of current schooling on TFP beyond the
working life of the currently active cohorts. The specific technical progress function
underlying our calculations is the same one used in Box 4, i.e.
(2) ∆xit = γio - λxit + γYSSit
where -xit measures the distance to the world technological frontier, which is assumed to
shift out over time at a constant rate g, and λ can be interpreted as the speed of technological
diffusion.
Under the assumption that the direct costs of schooling are a given fraction µ of output per
employed worker, the net social rate of return to education will be given by29
(3) r = R + g
where g is the world rate of technological progress and R solves the following equation 
(4) 
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______________________________________________________________________
29
 See de la Fuente (2002a) for a derivation of this result.
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Box 5 (continued)
______________________________________________________________________
In this expression, ρ = f'(S)/f(S) is the aggregate Mincerian returns to schooling parameter
(for the EU), U = T-S the duration in years of the working life of the representative
individual and the rest of the terms have been defined above. This formula can be applied
with suitable modifications to the other cases of interest. To obtain the gross social rate of
return, we set µ = 0 in (4); to calculate private returns, we set γYS = 0 and replace ρ  by the
relevant (adjusted or unadjusted) individual Mincerian parameter (θ).
For the calculations reported in this section, we assume that g = 0.015, λ = 0.074, and U =
42. The first estimate is taken from Jones (2002), the second from an updated version of de la
Fuente and Doménech (2000) and the third is chosen as a plausible value for industrial
countries, where younger cohorts often leave school in their twenties and workers tend to
retire before turning 65.
The values of µ used in the social and private returns calculation are 12.45% and 0.93%
respectively. The first figure is derived as a weighted average of total expenditure on
secondary and university education (with weights of 2/3 and 1/3 respectively) in the average
EU country (excluding Luxembourg) as reported in the 2000 edition of the OECD's Education at
a Glance. This source reports expenditure as a fraction of GDP per capita in 1997. We estimate
µ as a fraction of output per worker by multiplying the original figure by the ratio of
employment to the total population in 1990, taken from an updated version of Doménech and
Boscá (1996). The value of µ relevant for the private returns calculation is estimated by
multiplying the previous figure by the share of educational expenditure financed by the
private sector in the same sample of countries, which is taken from the same OECD source.
The OECD reports these data separately for tertiary studies and for all other educational
levels combined, so we again take a weighted average with a weight of 1/3 for higher
education.
Our calculations of private returns are based on Mincerian estimates that capture the
average return to one more year of schooling across all educational levels and are therefore
not comparable to estimates based on wage premia for specific levels of education. They can
also differ from the realized returns over specific periods because wage trends for different
educational categories may deviate from the overall rate of technical progress assumed here.
______________________________________________________________________
It should be noted that the rates of return we compute do not incorporate the non-market
returns to schooling in home production and leisure (see section 3a.xi) and fail to take into
account the direct consumption value of education and its impact on labour force participation
and employment probabilities. As a result, they will underestimate the true returns to
schooling by an amount that may be large but it is extremely difficult to measure with
precision.
The formula given in equation (4) of Box 5 shows that the technical parameter we have
called the Mincerian returns to schooling is a proper rate of return only under very special
assumptions that do not hold in practice. To obtain proper rates of return, the estimated
Mincerian coefficients have to be adjusted for the direct costs of education, for the finiteness of
individuals' working lives, for technical progress and for rate effects, whenever these are
relevant.
Table 4 shows the proper gross and net rates of return implied by the range of parameter
values given in Tables 1 and 2 above for the average EU14 country in 1990. At the individual
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level we report rates of return based on both the unadjusted and the adjusted Mincerian
parameters. The first set of values measures the private incentives to invest in formal
education and the second set can be compared with macro estimates for the purpose of
quantifying the importance of externalities. The last block of the table contains estimates of
the rate of return on alternative assets. The returns on US stocks and government bonds are
taken from Arias and McMahon (2001) and are average values for the period 1975-95.30 The
rate of return on physical capital is calculated as rk = MPk - δ + g  where MPk is the marginal
product of this factor, δ the rate of depreciation and g the rate of technical progress.31 Our
estimate of MPk (= 13.1%) is the average value of the marginal product of capital in 1990 in a
sample of 14 EU countries computed using the production function estimated in the updated
version of de la Fuente and Doménech (2000) and the data used by these authors, which
includes an estimate of the stock of physical capital. We assume a depreciation rate of 5%
and a value of g of 1.5% (as in the calculations of the rate of return to education). This is in
rough agreement with the estimate of 15% for the US given in McMahon (1991) for the
marginal product of (non-residential) capital based on Bureau of Economic Analysis data on
capital income and the capital stock.
Table 4: Rates of return to schooling and to some alternative assets
__________________________________________
gross net
unadjusted private returns:
  min (θ = 6.5%) 5.97% 5.90%
  max (θ = 9%) 8.77% 8.68%
adjusted private returns:
  min (ρ = 4.33%) 4.71% 4.65%
  max (ρ = 6.00%) 6.87% 6.80%
social returns:
  min (ρ = 3.98%, γYS = 0) 4.20% 3.53%
  interm (ρ = 5.41%, γYS = 0) 6.15% 5.36%
  max (ρ = 5.41%, γYS = 0.90%) 11.85% 10.89%
returns to alternative assets:
  large company equity (US) 7.70%
  US government bonds 2.60%
 physical capital 9.60%
__________________________________________
-  Note: Unless otherwise indicated, these figures refer to an average EU country around 1990.
A number of pairwise comparisons between these different rates of return can be
informative. Figure 6 displays the gross social and (corrected) private rates of return to
30
 We use data for the US because we have not found comparable data for the EU, but we do not expect
that existing differences will be large enough to affect our conclusions.
31
 This formula comes out of a calculation analogous to the one described in Box 5, which is much simpler
in the case of physical capital because of the absence of delays and rate effects.
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schooling, with the former shown as a function of the rate effects parameter, γYS. The figure
illustrates the implications of the broad spread of parameter estimates found in the
literature for the importance of externalities. At the lower end of the range, our
macroeconomic parameter estimates are consistent with their microeconometric counterparts
and suggest that the productivity effects of human capital, while sizable, are fully reflected
in wages. The upper range of the estimates, however, implies that technology-related
externalities are extremely large, and account for up to one half of the social return to
education. For the more plausible intermediate estimates of the rate effects parameter (0.3 to
0.4%), technological externalities add between two and a half and three points to the social
return to education.
Figure 6: Gross social and adjusted private returns to schooling as a function of γYS
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In the absence of public intervention, the existence of externalities of the type the
macroeconometric estimates seem to be picking up would generate a tendency for private
underinvestment in schooling. Most governments, however, heavily subsidize education and
have enacted compulsory schooling laws. Since both types of measures will tend to raise
educational investment, thus counteracting the effects of the externalities, the level of
schooling we observe may be either too high or too low when compared with the social
optimum. A comparison of the returns to schooling with those available from alternative
productive assets can potentially give us some information about the optimality of the
outcome observed in the average EU country.
In principle, the relevant comparison would be between the net social returns to education
and the returns to physical capital. In practice, there is considerable uncertainty about the
values of the relevant rates of return. In addition to the existing uncertainty about the size of
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the external effects of education that have been emphasized in this report, there are two
considerations. The first one is that, as we have already noted, our estimates are likely to
understate the social rate of return to education because they only consider direct productivity
effects. The second is that it is not entirely clear how we should measure the return to
physical capital. Our production function-based estimate of this magnitude is significantly
larger than observed stock returns (which, incidentally, include the returns on all corporate
assets, and not only on physical capital). One possible reason for this is that we may be
underestimating the relevant rate of depreciation or overestimating the coefficient of
physical capital in the production function, αk, and a second one that stock returns are net of
intermediation costs that may be considerable and should probably not be counted as part of
the net return to capital. At any rate, it may be expected that the relevant rate of return on
physical capital should fall somewhere between these two magnitudes.
Figure 7: Net social returns to schooling vs. returns to physical capital
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
11%
12%
0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0%
net social return to schooling
return on physical capital (max)
return on physical capital (min)
rate effects parameter
Figure 7 plots the net social returns to schooling as a function of the rate effects parameter
(γYS) together with the plausible range of rates of return on physical capital. Values of γYS
that fall about half-way within the range of existing estimates suggest that the direct
economic returns to schooling are probably in line with those available from investment in
physical capital. Since our measure of the social returns to education does not include its non-
market benefits, or those derived from its contribution to social cohesion, a plausible case can
be made for the view that an increase in human capital investment may be justified. This
argument, however, relies on the existence of significant rate effects or other non-market
returns to education, as the direct level effects that are reflected in wages imply rates of
return to schooling that are significantly below those available from alternative assets.
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A comparison between net private and social returns is also of interest to determine to what
extent private and social incentives may be misaligned in Europe. But once again, it is not
entirely clear what specific rates of return should be used in the comparison. Private
incentives are best captured by the unadjusted net private rates of return (5.90% to 8.68%)
given in the first block of Table 4, as these reflect the expected benefits that are available to
individuals through increased wages. As noted above, these unadjusted private rates of return
do not hold physical capital constant, whereas the social rates of return we have computed
do. To make them comparable, we need to make some assumption about how the aggregate
stock of physical capital will respond to increased investment in education because, given the
complementarity between the two types of capital, an increase in the physical capital stock
will raise the returns to schooling.
The simplest assumption to make is that the country is a small open economy that has
unlimited access to capital at the going world interest rate. Since this is essentially the
assumption we made at the microeconomic level, the required adjustment would involve
multiplying the social rate of return shown in Table 4 by the inverse of the coefficient we used
above to adjust the private rates of return down and would leave the social rate of return
above the private return (even taking into account subsidies) starting with relatively low
values of the rate effects parameter. At the regional level, where the small open economy
assumption is probably a good approximation, this result suggests that there may be reasons
for shifting investment priorities from physical to human capital. Indeed, increased subsidies
to human capital formation in backward regions may be an effective component of cohesion
policies, but two important qualifications to this conclusion should  be kept in mind. The first
is that there is an element of zero-sum game in this, as the inflow of mobile resources that is
likely to follow the increase in human capital investment will come at the expense of other
regions. The second is that, as suggested by our discussion of regional externalities in Section
3b.v, it is very likely that technology-related externalities operate at the country level
rather than at the regional level. Hence, some of the benefits of additional investment in
human capital in backward regions may spill over to more advanced ones, thereby reducing
the desired impact on regional cohesion.
The case for additional subsidies is considerably weaker when examined from a national
or EU-wide perspective. At this level of aggregation, the assumption of perfect capital
mobility is probably quite inadequate, as suggested by the high correlation observed between
national savings and investment rates. Since these are large economies, they would face an
upward sloping supply schedule for capital and would have to rely at least partly on
domestic accumulation for increases in the stock of physical capital. As a result, the social
return to schooling when we do not hold capital constant may not be much higher than the
estimate shown in Table 4 (because the aggregate stock of this factor will increase only
gradually and possibly at a higher cost). In this situation, there is a factor that partially
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offsets the externality and it has to do with the fact that individuals and firms (or even
regions) are in a better position than countries to exploit the potential benefits of human
capital investment because, unlike countries, they have rapid and unlimited access at given
prices to complementary inputs whose use will raise the return to educational investment.
Finally, it is worth noting that the (unadjusted) private returns to schooling investment
compare rather favourably with the returns on debt and equity, especially if some allowance
is made for non-market returns and employment effects. Human capital, however, is a risky
asset because there is considerable variation in wages across workers with the same level of
educational attainment. Although part of this variation will reflect differences in ability
and pay differentials that compensate for various job attributes, individuals are likely to
require a sizable risk premium to invest in human capital. Since we lack good measures of the
riskiness of such investment, it is not obvious whether the observed pattern of returns makes
education a sufficiently attractive investment alternative from an individual point of view.
The observed premium over the riskless rate of return (3.2 to 5 percentage points) is
comparable to the one on equity or even higher and seems large enough to provide reasonable
incentives for investment in education. But it is also true that the expected return on human
capital is probably lower than the rate of interest on unsecured personal loans that may be
used to finance educational expenditures, when these loans are available at all. Hence,
liquidity constraints are more likely to be a problem than low returns per se, particularly in
those countries where public student loan programmes do not exist.
Although caution is clearly needed for a number of reasons that have already been
discussed (and include the considerable uncertainty that remains about the values of the
relevant macroeconomic parameters and the size of the social benefits from human capital not
captured by the existing empirical estimates), we believe that the preceding discussion
supports the following tentative conclusions:
First, a moderate increase in human capital investment is probably a good idea. The direct
economic returns to schooling investment that are captured by macroeconometric studies are
comparable to those available from investment in physical capital. When a reasonable
allowance is made for the non-market returns to education and for its benefits for social
cohesion, human capital becomes a rather attractive investment alternative from a social
point of view.
Second, an across-the-board increase in general subsidies to formal education at the post-
compulsory level is probably not necessary. This conclusion may be somewhat surprising in
view of our emphasis on the importance of human capital externalities, but it must be kept in
mind that large subsidies are already in place and that compulsory school attendance also
helps to counteract the effects of such externalities. An additional consideration that works
in the same direction is that, as we have seen, individuals and firms are in a better position
than countries to exploit the potential benefits of human capital investment. These factors
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help explain our finding that the private rate of return relevant for individual schooling
decisions compares quite favourably with the social rate of return on education and with
those on competing assets available to households.
Hence, the economic incentives for individuals to invest in education are probably
adequate. If a further increase in post-compulsory enrollments is considered desirable, it may
be more important to eliminate implicit barriers to access to advanced programmes (such as
liquidity constraints and lower levels of basic skills for individuals from disadvantaged
backgrounds) through policies specifically targeted at these problems, rather than further
decrease already low tuition charges that imply a large subsidy for relatively privileged
groups.32 Indeed, higher tuition fees coupled with a well designed loan programme or with an
increase in means-tested grants may be an efficient way to provide additional resources to
increase the quality of post-secondary education while at the same time reducing the
regressivity of its financing. Additional public funds, however, may be required at lower
educational levels and for the expansion of adult training.
It should be stressed that our conclusions are drawn from the analysis of a hypothetical
average EU country and, consequently, may have to be modified depending on the particular
circumstances of specific countries or regions. In general terms, the case for additional
investment in human resources is likely to be stronger in those territories where expenditure is
low and/or human capital is scarce relative to other productive assets. Similarly, the need
for additional subsidies will vary across countries depending on existing financing
arrangements and on the extent to which payscales provide adequate incentives for private
investment in education.
6. Concluding remarks
Our analysis offers some guidance in identifying the most productive uses of additional
educational expenditure as well as changes in current practices that may increase efficiency.
Our review of the literature indicates that the most important source of non privately
appropriable "excess returns" from human capital investment is likely to be this factor’s
complementarity with technology. This suggests the following broad objectives for human
capital policies. First, aim to give technology-related skills to a broad segment of the
population and ensure the adequate supply of technical and scientific personnel needed both
for development and for adoption of new technologies. Second, support life-long learning in
order to counteract the accelerated depreciation of skills in times of rapid technological
change. Third, improve conditions for the accumulation of research-related human capital.
Much of this human capital is generated as a by-product of research itself and human capital
32 See for instance OECD (2001b).
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policies should therefore strengthen the link between tertiary education and both private
and public research.
The second most important source of aggregate excess returns to human capital is likely to
come from its contribution to social cohesion and social capital. Our review of the literature
suggests that the objective of enhancing social cohesion and building social capital does not
stand in contradiction with human capital policies targeting complementarities between
human capital and technology. Giving technology-related skills to a broad majority of the
labour force will require policies supporting the acquisition of such skills in segments of the
population with historically low levels of human capital and is therefore an opportunity for
increasing social cohesion. The complementarity between early human capital and formal
education as well as on-the-job training documented in the literature suggests, however, that
the success of such policies will depend crucially on generalizing access to early learning
opportunities. Research on non-market returns to human capital indicates that early-learning
policies will also generate benefits in terms of life-long learning. The complementarity
between formal education and on-the-job training suggests moreover that human capital
policies should enhance adult learning to prevent marginalization of individuals who have
missed the educational opportunities of formal schooling.
Another point that comes out from our review of the literature is that the quality of
human capital is likely to be crucial for economic growth. Raising the quality of education
should therefore be at the center of human capital policies. Empirical work points towards
some concrete steps to accomplish this objective, but considerable uncertainty remains and
more research is necessary to identify the determinants of school performance and student
achievement. It is already clear, however, that the objective of raising the average quality
of human capital does not stand in contradiction with the objective of enhancing social
cohesion, as international educational assessment excercises demonstrate that countries with
relatively high average achievement are also relatively more successful in raising the
performance of students from disadvantaged backgrounds.33
On the whole, the evidence we have reviewed is consistent with the view that measures
aimed at increasing the quantity and quality of the stock of human capital should be an
important part of any growth-promoting policy package. This is certainly so in the case of the
Lisbon strategy, which echoes many of the recommendations found in the literature.
Implementation of the human capital policies outlined in successive EU summits appears
especially important for those regions of the European Union that are lagging behind in
productivity and income per capita. It is important to recognize, however, that successful
action requires a clear picture of the quantity and quality of regional human capital stocks in
order to understand regional needs and to identify those policies that are likely to be most
33
 See OECD and Statistics Canada (2000) and OECD (2001c).
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effective. For example, it would be important to extend to the regional level recent studies
that have tried to assess the skill levels of younger cohorts and of the workforce at large, and
to support further research into the determinants of the performance of educational systems.
These studies can be a useful input for the formulation of a systematic human resources policy
that should be an important part of the EU's ongoing effort to increase regional cohesion.
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